With the return of rookie offensive tackle Sebastian Vollmer, the Patriots opted to go with a strict rotation at left tackle and right tackle against the Panthers on Sunday. Veterans Matt Light and Nick Kaczur started at left tackle and right tackle, respectively, and played each of the Patriots' first two series.
Starting with the Patriots' third series, however, Vollmer played both left tackle in place of Light and right tackle in place of Kaczur. The rotation gave each player a chance to take a breather -- but it also seemed to give the Patriots a chance to evaluate who fit best at left tackle and right tackle.
"It looked like all of them had a chance to play," Patriots coach Bill Belichick. "I’m not sure exactly how the number of plays worked out, but they all played a significant part. I think that was probably good for them to get a little break. It’s not often those guys do and are able to come back in and be fresh and go on those long drives. But we tried to work Sebastian back in this week, and he did with a decent number of plays."
An examination of the yardage statistics reveals something interesting: The Patriots were far more productive with Light at left tackle and Vollmer at right tackle than any other combination. It's a small sample size, but it's interesting nonetheless to see how productive the Patriots were with each of their three offensive tackles on the field:
* Light: 40 plays, 333 yards (8.325 yards per play)
* Vollmer: 34 plays, 283 yards (8.324 yards per play)
* Kaczur: 32 plays, 184 yards (5.75 yards per play)
Here's the left tackle-right tackle breakdown from the Patriots' longest drives of the day:
* 96 yards: Light/Vollmer
* 63 yards: Light/Vollmer
* 57 yards: Light/Vollmer
* 54 yards: Light/Kaczur
* 47 yards: Vollmer/Kaczur
The versatility of Vollmer made the rotation possible. Belichick has raved about the versatility of his rookie ever since he drafted him, and the rotation would have been virtually impossible without a tackle who can play both sides.
“You practice it and try to be ready when the situation comes," Vollmer said. "When Coach tells you to get in, you better be ready, so I take every chance, every opportunity I get in practice and in the game to get better.”
Nick Kaczur did play left tackle in college. Mark LeVoir can play either left tackle or right tackle -- albeit in a backup role. Matt Light began his NFL career at right tackle and was a disaster. That, though, is more the norm around the NFL. Vollmer is pretty unique in his ability to play at both ends of the line as well as he does.
"It's a little bit unusual for tackles to be able to play both sides at a high level," Patriots coach Bill Belichick said. "Most tackles, usually, when you look at a normal draft board, you look at tackles and say, 'This tackle is more of a left tackle, and this tackle is more of a right tackle.' You have a few guys, maybe a quarter of them, as a guesstimate, where, 'This guy looks like he could be a swing tackle. ... When you look at Vollmer, he legimately can play both tackles."
Will Vollmer play both tackles the rest of the way? Belichick declined to specify on Monday whether he'd like to keep up the rotation in the future or if he'd like to settle on two guys to play the entire game. Kaczur went down with a shoulder injury in the third quarter, so the point could be moot.
But the Patriots did seem to be most produtive on Sunday with Light at left tackle and Vollmer on the right -- and it wouldn't be surprising to see them go with that tandem the rest of the way.
"I'd like to win," Belichick said. "I'd like to win. Whatever gives us the best chance to win, whatever we feel is best to win, then that’s what we’ll do."
Monday, December 14, 2009
Sunday, December 13, 2009
Baker's blocking a key to win
Much has been made this week about the production -- or lack thereof -- of the Patriots' tight ends.
But production has to do with a more than catching passes.
The only pass Tom Brady threw toward Chris Baker bounced off his helmet, a play that epitomized the rough first half the Patriots' passing game endured. But Baker had quite a bit to do with the Patriots' success running the ball -- and running the ball might have been the difference for the Patriots against the Carolina Panthers on Sunday.
The Patriots finished with 185 rushing yards, their second-highest total of the season. Laurence Maroney rushed 22 times for 94 yards, and Kevin Faulk and Sammy Morris rushed for 58 and 35 yards, respectively. Even better, all three running backs had carries for at least 15 yards in the game.
"Good blocking and good running," Patriots coach Bill Belichick said. "There's no real magic formula to it. We've got to block them, and they've got a lot of guys to block."
Baker in particular seemed to block just about everyone in his way. On the Patriots' first big play of the game, the eighth-year veteran got his hands on defensive end Julius Peppers and shoved him out of the way of Maroney, paving the way for a 17-yard gain. Later in the second quarter, Sammy Morris ran a draw up the middle in which Baker served as the lead blocker, clearing out the linebacker to give Morris room to maneuver.
The Patriots have always loved two styles of run more than any other: Draws up the middle out of the shotgun and sweeps around the edge. Both require strong blocking from tight ends.
Runs around the edge haven't produced yards consistently for the Patriots this season, but they made it work on Sunday. Even on the third-quarter run on which Morris fumbled the ball, he was 10 yards down the sideline behind Baker before safety Charles Godfrey popped the ball loose -- and that was because Baker had buried outside ilnebacker James Anderson.
"Both tight ends were able to get the edge," Baker said. "Me and Ben (Watson) were able to get the edge. We were able to get good movement and good push on the ends and the linebackers."
The hesitation of a draw play only works because it allows a tight end on the edge to get through the hole and hit the middle linebacker -- in this case, the Panthers' Jon Beason -- and prevent him from getting anywhere near the running back with the ball.
Midway through a fourth-quarter drive that led to a field goal, Baker pulled from the right side of the line to the left and plastered the Panthers' prolific middle linebacker en route to a gain of eight yards for Laurence Maroney.
"The line has to get their guys moving, and that's what they did," Baker said. "After they got their guys moving, I was able to come in there and get a good clean look and get in there after Beason."
Said Belichick, "We got the ball outside, and we also ran plays inside, so we had some balance in the running game. That helped us on some play action passes. We got some guys open."
And Watson, the tight end of the other side, made the biggest catch of the game, a third-and-5 touchdown catch that gave the Patriots the lead for the first time. The much-maligned former first-round draft pick -- he was a candidate to be released at the end of training camp -- caught three passes for 37 yards in the game.
"Everyone always asks me, 'Why don't you get the ball to Ben?'" Patriots quarterback Tom Brady said. "When we do get it to him, he makes those plays."
But production has to do with a more than catching passes.
The only pass Tom Brady threw toward Chris Baker bounced off his helmet, a play that epitomized the rough first half the Patriots' passing game endured. But Baker had quite a bit to do with the Patriots' success running the ball -- and running the ball might have been the difference for the Patriots against the Carolina Panthers on Sunday.
The Patriots finished with 185 rushing yards, their second-highest total of the season. Laurence Maroney rushed 22 times for 94 yards, and Kevin Faulk and Sammy Morris rushed for 58 and 35 yards, respectively. Even better, all three running backs had carries for at least 15 yards in the game.
"Good blocking and good running," Patriots coach Bill Belichick said. "There's no real magic formula to it. We've got to block them, and they've got a lot of guys to block."
Baker in particular seemed to block just about everyone in his way. On the Patriots' first big play of the game, the eighth-year veteran got his hands on defensive end Julius Peppers and shoved him out of the way of Maroney, paving the way for a 17-yard gain. Later in the second quarter, Sammy Morris ran a draw up the middle in which Baker served as the lead blocker, clearing out the linebacker to give Morris room to maneuver.
The Patriots have always loved two styles of run more than any other: Draws up the middle out of the shotgun and sweeps around the edge. Both require strong blocking from tight ends.
Runs around the edge haven't produced yards consistently for the Patriots this season, but they made it work on Sunday. Even on the third-quarter run on which Morris fumbled the ball, he was 10 yards down the sideline behind Baker before safety Charles Godfrey popped the ball loose -- and that was because Baker had buried outside ilnebacker James Anderson.
"Both tight ends were able to get the edge," Baker said. "Me and Ben (Watson) were able to get the edge. We were able to get good movement and good push on the ends and the linebackers."
The hesitation of a draw play only works because it allows a tight end on the edge to get through the hole and hit the middle linebacker -- in this case, the Panthers' Jon Beason -- and prevent him from getting anywhere near the running back with the ball.
Midway through a fourth-quarter drive that led to a field goal, Baker pulled from the right side of the line to the left and plastered the Panthers' prolific middle linebacker en route to a gain of eight yards for Laurence Maroney.
"The line has to get their guys moving, and that's what they did," Baker said. "After they got their guys moving, I was able to come in there and get a good clean look and get in there after Beason."
Said Belichick, "We got the ball outside, and we also ran plays inside, so we had some balance in the running game. That helped us on some play action passes. We got some guys open."
And Watson, the tight end of the other side, made the biggest catch of the game, a third-and-5 touchdown catch that gave the Patriots the lead for the first time. The much-maligned former first-round draft pick -- he was a candidate to be released at the end of training camp -- caught three passes for 37 yards in the game.
"Everyone always asks me, 'Why don't you get the ball to Ben?'" Patriots quarterback Tom Brady said. "When we do get it to him, he makes those plays."
Halftime report: Panthers 7, Patriots 7
A handful of observations from a lackluster first half:
* Boos rain down. It's hard to believe this is virtually the same offense that broke record after record just two seasons ago. Tom Brady and his cohorts were booed after a third-and-12 pass went for just two yards, and they were booed even louder when a third-and-4 pass behind Sammy Morris slightly was dropped.
A couple of ticky-tack penalty calls saved the Patriots from more boos on their next drive. Ben Watson drew a questionable pass-interference call down the right sideline, and third wide receiver Isaiah Stanback drew a defensive holding call in the end zone after Brady had missed on a pass toward Randy Moss. Kevin Faulk ran through a big hole in the middle of the line for a touchdown -- the Patriots' first in almost four full quarters of action.
* Ugly day for Moss. A summary of the first half for the Patriots' big-play wide receiver:
-- Lets a pass slip through his hands deep over the middle;
-- Sees Chris Gamble intercept a pass -- albeit an off-target pass -- thrown in his direction;
-- Catches a pass down the middle of the field only to allow linebacker Dan Connor to punch it free.
First-half numbers: One catch for 16 yards and a fumble.
The ineffectiveness of Brady -- 8-for-15 for 59 yards and an interception -- isn't helping. Moss had no shot at the pass that Brady air-mailed through the back of the end zone.
But the Patriots' most dangerous weapon, once again, hasn't been all that dangerous.
* Rotation at offensive line. With Sebastian Vollmer returning to action, the Patriots have gone with a straight rotation at offensive tackle. Nick Kaczur and Matt Light started the game, but Vollmer substituted first for Light and second for Kaczur, moving from left to right tackle and back again. Kaczur has had all kinds of trouble with Pro Bowl defensive end Julius Peppers, and it'll be interesting to see if the Patriots stick with the rotation or go exclusively with Light at left tackle and Vollmer at right tackle.
* Tight end blocking. Tight end Chris Baker has only had one pass thrown in his direction, and it bounced off his helmet. But catching passes isn't all Baker does. The tight end was the lead blocker on a pair of 17-yard runs in the first quarter, escorting Laurence Maroney around the left side and then pulling through the middle of the line in front of Sammy Morris.
Patriots running backs have 86 rushing yards on 16 carries thus far, an average of 5.4 yards per carry.
* Boos rain down. It's hard to believe this is virtually the same offense that broke record after record just two seasons ago. Tom Brady and his cohorts were booed after a third-and-12 pass went for just two yards, and they were booed even louder when a third-and-4 pass behind Sammy Morris slightly was dropped.
A couple of ticky-tack penalty calls saved the Patriots from more boos on their next drive. Ben Watson drew a questionable pass-interference call down the right sideline, and third wide receiver Isaiah Stanback drew a defensive holding call in the end zone after Brady had missed on a pass toward Randy Moss. Kevin Faulk ran through a big hole in the middle of the line for a touchdown -- the Patriots' first in almost four full quarters of action.
* Ugly day for Moss. A summary of the first half for the Patriots' big-play wide receiver:
-- Lets a pass slip through his hands deep over the middle;
-- Sees Chris Gamble intercept a pass -- albeit an off-target pass -- thrown in his direction;
-- Catches a pass down the middle of the field only to allow linebacker Dan Connor to punch it free.
First-half numbers: One catch for 16 yards and a fumble.
The ineffectiveness of Brady -- 8-for-15 for 59 yards and an interception -- isn't helping. Moss had no shot at the pass that Brady air-mailed through the back of the end zone.
But the Patriots' most dangerous weapon, once again, hasn't been all that dangerous.
* Rotation at offensive line. With Sebastian Vollmer returning to action, the Patriots have gone with a straight rotation at offensive tackle. Nick Kaczur and Matt Light started the game, but Vollmer substituted first for Light and second for Kaczur, moving from left to right tackle and back again. Kaczur has had all kinds of trouble with Pro Bowl defensive end Julius Peppers, and it'll be interesting to see if the Patriots stick with the rotation or go exclusively with Light at left tackle and Vollmer at right tackle.
* Tight end blocking. Tight end Chris Baker has only had one pass thrown in his direction, and it bounced off his helmet. But catching passes isn't all Baker does. The tight end was the lead blocker on a pair of 17-yard runs in the first quarter, escorting Laurence Maroney around the left side and then pulling through the middle of the line in front of Sammy Morris.
Patriots running backs have 86 rushing yards on 16 carries thus far, an average of 5.4 yards per carry.
Nagging injuries slowing Patriots down
From ESPN's Adam Schefter this morning: "Tom Brady will play today -- but those ribs, and that finger, and that shoulder, and that knee, are a little worse than people realize."
Brady hasn't looked like himself for the last two weeks.
The Patriots haven't looked like themselves, either.
Maybe injuries have been a factor for both.
The Patriots' injury report has looked a little bit like its 53-man roster this month. Seventeen players were listed as questionable for the game at New Orleans, and 14 were listed as questionable a week ago against Miami. Nine were listed as questionable for today's game against the Carolina Panthers -- including Brady, who was listed with injuries to his right shoulder, his right finger and his ribs. Among other notables:
* LB Tully Banta-Cain (shoulder)
* WR Julian Edelman (forearm)
* DE Jarvis Green (knee)
* OT Nick Kaczur (ankle)
* OG Stephen Neal (ankle)
* RB Fred Taylor (ankle)
* DE Ty Warren (ankle)
Not one of those players were full-go during any of the Patriots' practices this week. Not one of those players will be full-go even if they're activated today. On top of that, defensive tackle Myron Pryor did not practice at all this week and almost certainly will not be active today.
Football, of course, is a game of injuries. But the Patriots have been hit hard with nagging injuries at key spots -- especially along the offensive line. Season-ending injuries can be crippling to a team, but if its best players spend week after week dealing with pain that limits their mobility or strength, well, that's almost as tough to deal with.
Brady hasn't looked like himself for the last two weeks.
The Patriots haven't looked like themselves, either.
Maybe injuries have been a factor for both.
The Patriots' injury report has looked a little bit like its 53-man roster this month. Seventeen players were listed as questionable for the game at New Orleans, and 14 were listed as questionable a week ago against Miami. Nine were listed as questionable for today's game against the Carolina Panthers -- including Brady, who was listed with injuries to his right shoulder, his right finger and his ribs. Among other notables:
* LB Tully Banta-Cain (shoulder)
* WR Julian Edelman (forearm)
* DE Jarvis Green (knee)
* OT Nick Kaczur (ankle)
* OG Stephen Neal (ankle)
* RB Fred Taylor (ankle)
* DE Ty Warren (ankle)
Not one of those players were full-go during any of the Patriots' practices this week. Not one of those players will be full-go even if they're activated today. On top of that, defensive tackle Myron Pryor did not practice at all this week and almost certainly will not be active today.
Football, of course, is a game of injuries. But the Patriots have been hit hard with nagging injuries at key spots -- especially along the offensive line. Season-ending injuries can be crippling to a team, but if its best players spend week after week dealing with pain that limits their mobility or strength, well, that's almost as tough to deal with.
Going five years with Jason Bay
In what might be little more than posturing -- it would be irresponsible, after all, to close the door this early -- Jason Bay's agent told several reporters on Saturday that the left fielder is prepared to turn his attention to the other offers on the table.
"We don't agree with their evaluation of the player," agent Joe Urbon said. "Frankly, we have other offers on the table that are of greater interest to Jason."
The educated guess is that Theo Epstein would be willing to overpay a little bit for Bay in the short-term but thus far have refused to lock the Red Sox into a five-year contract. Bay turned 31 years old in September, and he would go into the final season of a five-year deal at the age of 35, turning 36 in time for that year's playoffs.
There's little doubt the left fielder's already limited range would diminish as he turned 34 and 35 years old.
With the contract of David Ortiz expiring after the 2010 season, however, there might be a spot for Bay as the Red Sox designated hitter -- if his bat holds up, that is, better than his range in the outfield.
Making predictions can be tricky. That's the biggest reason the Red Sox are so reluctant to give out five-year contracts to players already on the wrong side of 30 -- or, at least, five-year contracts to players not named J.D. Drew on the wrong side of 30.
(Drew has quite a bit to do with these negotiations -- and it's not just the fact that his contract, both in length and in amount, is a baseline for Bay. Drew might still be an above-average right fielder at age 33 or age 34, but it behooves the Red Sox to keep the option open to move him to left field either in 2010 or 2011. If Bay balks at the idea of being the heir to David Ortiz as the team's full-time designated hitter, there might not be room for both Bay and Drew in the Red Sox outfield in 2011.)
Trying to predict how well Bay will play defense in five years is one thing. Trying to predict how well Bay will hit, though, might be even more important. Let's take a look at the similar hitters on Bay's Baseball-Reference.com page and see how well they would have justified the type of contract Bay appears to want:
(For the sake of comparison, to this point in his career, Bay has a slash line of .280/.376/.519 and an OPS+ of 131. At the age of 30, Bay had a slash line of .267/.384/.537 and an OPS+ of 134.)
Ryan Klesko: 145 OPS+ at age 30
Age 31: .300/.388/.537 (OPS+ of 152)
Age 32: .252/.354/.456 (118)
Age 33: .291/.399/.448 (129)
Age 34: .248/.358/.418 (110)
Age 35: Missed season with shoulder injury
Geoff Jenkins: 130 OPS+ at age 30
Age 31: .271/.357/.434 (OPS+ of 101)
Age 32: .255/.319/.471 (101)
Age 33: .301/.392/.392 (79)
Age 34: Released before the end of spring training
Tim Salmon: 119 OPS+ at age 30
Age 31: .290/.404/.540 (OPS+ of 135)
Age 32: .227/.365/.383 (98)
Age 33: .286/.380/.503 (133)
Age 34: .275/.374/.464 (122)
Age 35: .253/.306/.323 (67)
Bobby Higginson: 120 OPS+ at age 30
Age 31: .282/.345/.417 (OPS+ of 109)
Age 32: .235/.320/.369 (88)
Age 33: .246/.353/.388 (98)
Age 34: .077/.111/.077 (minus-48)
Age 35: Out of baseball
Jim Edmonds: 146 OPS+ at age 30
Age 31: .304/.410/.564 (OPS+ of 149)
Age 32: .311/.420/.561 (158)
Age 33: .275/.385/.617 (160)
Age 34: .301/.418/.643 (170)
Age 35: .263/.385/.533 (137)
George Foster: 155 OPS+ at age 30
Age 31: .273/.362/.473 (OPS+ of 131)
Age 32: .295/.373/.519 (150)
Age 33: .247/.309/.367 (90)
Age 34: .241/.289/.419 (95)
Age 35: .269/.311/.443 (111)
Willie Stargell: 125 OPS+ at age 30
Age 31: .295/.398/.628 (OPS+ of 185)
Age 32: .293/.373/.558 (163)
Age 33: .299/.392/.646 (186)
Age 34: .301/.407/.537 (167)
Age 35: .295/.375/.516 (147)
Richard Hidalgo: OPS+ of 128 at age 30
Age 31: Played in Japan
Age 32: Released in spring training
Kevin Mitchell: OPS+ of 118 at age 30
Age 31: .341/.385/.601 (OPS+ of 159)
Age 32: .326/.429/.681 (185)
Age 33: Played in Japan
Age 34: .316/.420/.505 (138)
Age 35: .153/.275/.373 (66)
The 10th player on the list, actually, is Drew, but his data has to be thrown out because he hasn't played his age 34 or age 35 seasons yet -- the seasons most relevant to the Urbon-Epstein debate.
Of the above nine, only Edmonds and Stargell would have justified a $15 million salary at the age of 35. Klesko was all but done. Salmon was all but done. Mitchell was all but done. Hidalgo, Higginson and Jenkins were already done. Foster was productive but not exactly a middle-of-the-order type of hitter.
(The steroid era makes comparisons difficult given the way chemical assistance prolonged careers but also caused injuries and precipitous drops in production. It is what it is. There's no way around it.)
In the last five seasons, 44 outfielders have qualified for the batting title at the age of 34 or older. Seventeen have compiled an OPS+ of 120 or better. Eight have compiled an OPS+ of 130 or better.
Of the 26 outfielders who have qualified for the batting title at age 35 this decade, 12 have put up an OPS+ of 120 or better. Among those who fell short: Bobby Abreu, Sammy Sosa, Magglio Ordonez, Bernie Williams, Brian Giles, Jermaine Dye and Moises Alou.
(The tale of Ordonez ought to be particularly cautionary -- especially he signed for the same five-year, $75 million deal an educated guess has Bay being willing to accept.)
Any way you look at it, it's a 50-50 shot -- or worse -- that Bay will be a $15 million hitter, let alone fielder, by the time he's 35 years old. It's tough to blame his agent for holding out for a fifth year. It's tough to blame the Red Sox, though, for being so reluctant to give it to him.
"We don't agree with their evaluation of the player," agent Joe Urbon said. "Frankly, we have other offers on the table that are of greater interest to Jason."
The educated guess is that Theo Epstein would be willing to overpay a little bit for Bay in the short-term but thus far have refused to lock the Red Sox into a five-year contract. Bay turned 31 years old in September, and he would go into the final season of a five-year deal at the age of 35, turning 36 in time for that year's playoffs.
There's little doubt the left fielder's already limited range would diminish as he turned 34 and 35 years old.
With the contract of David Ortiz expiring after the 2010 season, however, there might be a spot for Bay as the Red Sox designated hitter -- if his bat holds up, that is, better than his range in the outfield.
Making predictions can be tricky. That's the biggest reason the Red Sox are so reluctant to give out five-year contracts to players already on the wrong side of 30 -- or, at least, five-year contracts to players not named J.D. Drew on the wrong side of 30.
(Drew has quite a bit to do with these negotiations -- and it's not just the fact that his contract, both in length and in amount, is a baseline for Bay. Drew might still be an above-average right fielder at age 33 or age 34, but it behooves the Red Sox to keep the option open to move him to left field either in 2010 or 2011. If Bay balks at the idea of being the heir to David Ortiz as the team's full-time designated hitter, there might not be room for both Bay and Drew in the Red Sox outfield in 2011.)
Trying to predict how well Bay will play defense in five years is one thing. Trying to predict how well Bay will hit, though, might be even more important. Let's take a look at the similar hitters on Bay's Baseball-Reference.com page and see how well they would have justified the type of contract Bay appears to want:
(For the sake of comparison, to this point in his career, Bay has a slash line of .280/.376/.519 and an OPS+ of 131. At the age of 30, Bay had a slash line of .267/.384/.537 and an OPS+ of 134.)
Ryan Klesko: 145 OPS+ at age 30
Age 31: .300/.388/.537 (OPS+ of 152)
Age 32: .252/.354/.456 (118)
Age 33: .291/.399/.448 (129)
Age 34: .248/.358/.418 (110)
Age 35: Missed season with shoulder injury
Geoff Jenkins: 130 OPS+ at age 30
Age 31: .271/.357/.434 (OPS+ of 101)
Age 32: .255/.319/.471 (101)
Age 33: .301/.392/.392 (79)
Age 34: Released before the end of spring training
Tim Salmon: 119 OPS+ at age 30
Age 31: .290/.404/.540 (OPS+ of 135)
Age 32: .227/.365/.383 (98)
Age 33: .286/.380/.503 (133)
Age 34: .275/.374/.464 (122)
Age 35: .253/.306/.323 (67)
Bobby Higginson: 120 OPS+ at age 30
Age 31: .282/.345/.417 (OPS+ of 109)
Age 32: .235/.320/.369 (88)
Age 33: .246/.353/.388 (98)
Age 34: .077/.111/.077 (minus-48)
Age 35: Out of baseball
Jim Edmonds: 146 OPS+ at age 30
Age 31: .304/.410/.564 (OPS+ of 149)
Age 32: .311/.420/.561 (158)
Age 33: .275/.385/.617 (160)
Age 34: .301/.418/.643 (170)
Age 35: .263/.385/.533 (137)
George Foster: 155 OPS+ at age 30
Age 31: .273/.362/.473 (OPS+ of 131)
Age 32: .295/.373/.519 (150)
Age 33: .247/.309/.367 (90)
Age 34: .241/.289/.419 (95)
Age 35: .269/.311/.443 (111)
Willie Stargell: 125 OPS+ at age 30
Age 31: .295/.398/.628 (OPS+ of 185)
Age 32: .293/.373/.558 (163)
Age 33: .299/.392/.646 (186)
Age 34: .301/.407/.537 (167)
Age 35: .295/.375/.516 (147)
Richard Hidalgo: OPS+ of 128 at age 30
Age 31: Played in Japan
Age 32: Released in spring training
Kevin Mitchell: OPS+ of 118 at age 30
Age 31: .341/.385/.601 (OPS+ of 159)
Age 32: .326/.429/.681 (185)
Age 33: Played in Japan
Age 34: .316/.420/.505 (138)
Age 35: .153/.275/.373 (66)
The 10th player on the list, actually, is Drew, but his data has to be thrown out because he hasn't played his age 34 or age 35 seasons yet -- the seasons most relevant to the Urbon-Epstein debate.
Of the above nine, only Edmonds and Stargell would have justified a $15 million salary at the age of 35. Klesko was all but done. Salmon was all but done. Mitchell was all but done. Hidalgo, Higginson and Jenkins were already done. Foster was productive but not exactly a middle-of-the-order type of hitter.
(The steroid era makes comparisons difficult given the way chemical assistance prolonged careers but also caused injuries and precipitous drops in production. It is what it is. There's no way around it.)
In the last five seasons, 44 outfielders have qualified for the batting title at the age of 34 or older. Seventeen have compiled an OPS+ of 120 or better. Eight have compiled an OPS+ of 130 or better.
Of the 26 outfielders who have qualified for the batting title at age 35 this decade, 12 have put up an OPS+ of 120 or better. Among those who fell short: Bobby Abreu, Sammy Sosa, Magglio Ordonez, Bernie Williams, Brian Giles, Jermaine Dye and Moises Alou.
(The tale of Ordonez ought to be particularly cautionary -- especially he signed for the same five-year, $75 million deal an educated guess has Bay being willing to accept.)
Any way you look at it, it's a 50-50 shot -- or worse -- that Bay will be a $15 million hitter, let alone fielder, by the time he's 35 years old. It's tough to blame his agent for holding out for a fifth year. It's tough to blame the Red Sox, though, for being so reluctant to give it to him.
Friday, December 11, 2009
Light has edge on Kaczur along line
Who wants to talk about something other than LateGate?
(Raises hand.)
Rookie left tackle Sebastian Vollmer was listed as "probable" on the Patriots' injury report on Friday, an indication that he's healthy again and ready to go.
The return of Vollmer presents Bill Belichick with the conundrum he's been avoiding since Vollmer first replaced Matt Light at left tackle in mid-October: Who's the odd man out?
Light and Nick Kaczur have anchored the two ends of the Patriots' offensive line for the last three seasons. But Vollmer, it appears, has been the Patriots' best pass-blocking and run-blocking tackle. Either Kaczur or Light is going to have to step aside to allow the rookie to play.
Belichick isn't going to base his decision simply on the way Kaczur and Light played on Sunday against Miami. A close examination of that game, though, might give us a better sense of the ability of each player -- a sense based on something other than reputation, anyway.
Let's do this the way they do it at ProFootballFocus.com. Let's go to the film and review each snap and grade both of the Patriots' offensive tackles:
* One point for a clean block, for the lineman doing his job;
* No points for a wishy-washy block or for a play in which the lineman wasn't involved -- though those plays are few and far between;
* Minus-one for getting beat on a pass-rush or pushed back on a run.
It's entirely subjective. But it's all we've got.
First half, first drive (6 plays)
Kaczur: 4
Light: 2
On a play-action pass that took a long time to develop, Light couldn't hold off Joey Porter long enough to keep him from drilling Brady in the ribs. Kaczur, on the other hand, boxed Keith Langford away from Brady until the ball was gone.
First half, second drive (13 plays)
Kaczur: 4
Light: 11
Kaczur picked up a couple of minuses on this drive -- including one on a third-and-7 pass in which he almost let his assigned guy get to Brady. But both Kaczur and Light executed textbook blocks on Kevin Faulk's rushing touchdown, rotating on an axis to keep Langford and Jason Taylor out of the play, respectively. Dan Koppen got downfield for the key block on Channing Crowder, but both Kaczur and Light did their jobs.
First half, third drive (4 plays)
Kaczur: 0
Light: 0
Light released clean on a third-and-2 screen pass but failed to block Vontae Davis, allowing the cornerback to drill Kevin Faulk inches short of the first-down marker. Randy Moss didn't make much of an effort to go after Gibril Wilson, either.
First half, fourth drive (7 plays)
Kaczur: 4
Light: 3
On the very next play, Light overran linebacker Akin Ayodele on a wide-receiver screen to the left. On the fourth-and-1 run the Dolphins stuffed, Kaczur finished the play flat on his back two yards deep in the Patriots' backfield.
First half, 30 total plays
Kaczur: 12
Light: 16
Second half, first drive (2 plays)
Kaczur: 1
Light: 1
Brady took a shot when he threw his 81-yard touchdown pass to Sam Aiken, but that was because defensive end Randy Starks torched Koppen one-on-one.
Second half, second drive (3 plays)
Kaczur: 3
Light: 2
On a third-and-6 pass down the right side for Moss, Light and Kaczur handled Porter and Cameron Wake, respectively. The pressure again came from the inside when Starks again got past Koppen.
Second half, third drive (6 plays)
Kaczur: 5
Light: 4
Jason Taylor came after Light on a deep pass to Welker in the middle, but by the time Brady released the ball, Light had pushed him a good 12 yards behind the line of scrimmage. Two plays later, on a play designed to be a wide-receiver screen, all Kaczur and Light did was dive at the feet of their assigned defenders -- but on a quick pass, their only job was to make sure their guys couldn't get their hands up. If they were looking down at the offensive linemen rolling into their ankles, they weren't going to bat away any passes.
Second half, fourth drive (7 plays)
Kaczur: 5
Light: 6
On the first-and-goal run before Brady threw his interception, Kaczur found himself pushed back at the line of scrimmage by Tony McDaniel, and the Dolphins plugged all the gaps to drop Sammy Morris for a loss of a yard.
Second half, fifth drive (3 plays)
Kaczur: 1
Light: 3
On the third-and-6 run by Faulk, Kaczur couldn't get Starks off the line of scrimmage, and Crowder quickly plugged the gap.
Second half, sixth drive (3 plays)
Kaczur: 1
Light: 2
The Patriots ran a stretch play to the edge on first-and-10 -- but they did so away from right side where both Light and Kaczur were. Instead, they ran to the left behind Mark LeVoir and the two tight ends -- and the play went nowhere.
Second half, seventh drive (3 plays)
Kaczur: 1
Light: 3
On the final meaningful play of the game, Kaczur got himself steamrolled by Wake, allowing the hit on Brady that caused him to throw it straight to Crowder.
Second half, 27 total plays
Kaczur: 17
Light: 21
Game, 57 total plays
Kaczur: 29
Light: 37
Edge to Light. Look for the two-time Pro Bowler to start at left tackle with Vollmer at right tackle on Sunday against Carolina.
(ProFootballFocus.com, for what it's worth, disagrees.)
(Raises hand.)
Rookie left tackle Sebastian Vollmer was listed as "probable" on the Patriots' injury report on Friday, an indication that he's healthy again and ready to go.
The return of Vollmer presents Bill Belichick with the conundrum he's been avoiding since Vollmer first replaced Matt Light at left tackle in mid-October: Who's the odd man out?
Light and Nick Kaczur have anchored the two ends of the Patriots' offensive line for the last three seasons. But Vollmer, it appears, has been the Patriots' best pass-blocking and run-blocking tackle. Either Kaczur or Light is going to have to step aside to allow the rookie to play.
Belichick isn't going to base his decision simply on the way Kaczur and Light played on Sunday against Miami. A close examination of that game, though, might give us a better sense of the ability of each player -- a sense based on something other than reputation, anyway.
Let's do this the way they do it at ProFootballFocus.com. Let's go to the film and review each snap and grade both of the Patriots' offensive tackles:
* One point for a clean block, for the lineman doing his job;
* No points for a wishy-washy block or for a play in which the lineman wasn't involved -- though those plays are few and far between;
* Minus-one for getting beat on a pass-rush or pushed back on a run.
It's entirely subjective. But it's all we've got.
First half, first drive (6 plays)
Kaczur: 4
Light: 2
On a play-action pass that took a long time to develop, Light couldn't hold off Joey Porter long enough to keep him from drilling Brady in the ribs. Kaczur, on the other hand, boxed Keith Langford away from Brady until the ball was gone.
First half, second drive (13 plays)
Kaczur: 4
Light: 11
Kaczur picked up a couple of minuses on this drive -- including one on a third-and-7 pass in which he almost let his assigned guy get to Brady. But both Kaczur and Light executed textbook blocks on Kevin Faulk's rushing touchdown, rotating on an axis to keep Langford and Jason Taylor out of the play, respectively. Dan Koppen got downfield for the key block on Channing Crowder, but both Kaczur and Light did their jobs.
First half, third drive (4 plays)
Kaczur: 0
Light: 0
Light released clean on a third-and-2 screen pass but failed to block Vontae Davis, allowing the cornerback to drill Kevin Faulk inches short of the first-down marker. Randy Moss didn't make much of an effort to go after Gibril Wilson, either.
First half, fourth drive (7 plays)
Kaczur: 4
Light: 3
On the very next play, Light overran linebacker Akin Ayodele on a wide-receiver screen to the left. On the fourth-and-1 run the Dolphins stuffed, Kaczur finished the play flat on his back two yards deep in the Patriots' backfield.
First half, 30 total plays
Kaczur: 12
Light: 16
Second half, first drive (2 plays)
Kaczur: 1
Light: 1
Brady took a shot when he threw his 81-yard touchdown pass to Sam Aiken, but that was because defensive end Randy Starks torched Koppen one-on-one.
Second half, second drive (3 plays)
Kaczur: 3
Light: 2
On a third-and-6 pass down the right side for Moss, Light and Kaczur handled Porter and Cameron Wake, respectively. The pressure again came from the inside when Starks again got past Koppen.
Second half, third drive (6 plays)
Kaczur: 5
Light: 4
Jason Taylor came after Light on a deep pass to Welker in the middle, but by the time Brady released the ball, Light had pushed him a good 12 yards behind the line of scrimmage. Two plays later, on a play designed to be a wide-receiver screen, all Kaczur and Light did was dive at the feet of their assigned defenders -- but on a quick pass, their only job was to make sure their guys couldn't get their hands up. If they were looking down at the offensive linemen rolling into their ankles, they weren't going to bat away any passes.
Second half, fourth drive (7 plays)
Kaczur: 5
Light: 6
On the first-and-goal run before Brady threw his interception, Kaczur found himself pushed back at the line of scrimmage by Tony McDaniel, and the Dolphins plugged all the gaps to drop Sammy Morris for a loss of a yard.
Second half, fifth drive (3 plays)
Kaczur: 1
Light: 3
On the third-and-6 run by Faulk, Kaczur couldn't get Starks off the line of scrimmage, and Crowder quickly plugged the gap.
Second half, sixth drive (3 plays)
Kaczur: 1
Light: 2
The Patriots ran a stretch play to the edge on first-and-10 -- but they did so away from right side where both Light and Kaczur were. Instead, they ran to the left behind Mark LeVoir and the two tight ends -- and the play went nowhere.
Second half, seventh drive (3 plays)
Kaczur: 1
Light: 3
On the final meaningful play of the game, Kaczur got himself steamrolled by Wake, allowing the hit on Brady that caused him to throw it straight to Crowder.
Second half, 27 total plays
Kaczur: 17
Light: 21
Game, 57 total plays
Kaczur: 29
Light: 37
Edge to Light. Look for the two-time Pro Bowler to start at left tackle with Vollmer at right tackle on Sunday against Carolina.
(ProFootballFocus.com, for what it's worth, disagrees.)
Boof!
The resume of former Twins starter Boof Bonser is far from impressive. The pitcher the Twins acquired (along with Joe Nathan and Francisco Liriano) from the Giants for A.J. Pierzynski seems to have washed out as a starting pitcher, putting up a 5.88 ERA as a starter in 2008 before missing the entire 2009 season with a torn labrum and torn rotator cuff.
It's a low-risk pickup for the Red Sox, and he certainly would be a reasonable fit as the long reliever at the end of the bullpen. After the trade of Justin Masterson at the end of July, the Red Sox really didn't have anyone in their bullpen capable of taking over in the fifth inning and pitching the rest of the way.
Manny Delcarmen and Ramon Ramirez made 20 and 15 appearances, respectively, in games in which the Red Sox already led or trailed by four or more runs, and Hideki Okajima even made eight appearances in what could be considered a mop-up role. Takashi Saito spent most of the season as the team's designated mop-up reliever, but even Saito pitched more than one inning just six times all season.
Bonser has a career strikeout-to-walk ratio of 2.54 and has had quite a bit of success (.247/.296/.404) against righties, so he could be a nice fit at the back end of the Red Sox bullpen.
If he's not, well, he'll probably be released in spring training without having cost the Red Sox all that much money. He's arbitration-eligible this winter and will be awarded a salary somewhere in the $1 million range, but if the Red Sox cut him before the season begins, he'll be entitled only to 45 days' termination pay.
***
Just for fun: A couple of years ago, when I was working at the St. Cloud Times in central Minnesota, a coworker and I tackled a completely pointless project -- writing songs about Twins players to the tune of Beatles songs. Pitcher Nick Blackburn, whose name fits nicely into the tune of "Blackbird," inspired the project, but more than 30 followed after that.
Writing a Beatles parody about Bonser especially seems to fit given that his given name at birth actually was John Paul Bonser. He had it legally changed to Boof back in 2001.
Anyway, the below song is a bit outdated since the Red Sox likely see Bonser as a last-arm-in-the-bullpen type of guy rather than a starting pitcher. He also hasn't been as productive as he was expected to be when this song was written back two years ago.
But why should that stop us? Enjoy.
Boof (to the tune of "Help!")
Boof!
I need a starter!
Boof!
Not just any starter!
Boof!
You know I need six innings!
Booooooooof!
When he was younger, so much younger than today
He couldn’t seem to win and had a lousy ERA
And now those pounds are gone; he feels way more mature
Now he finds, his curve is fine, his wins are more assured
Boof, oh, yes he can keep the ball down
And he’ll get them all to hit it on the ground
Boof can keep the bullpen safe and sound
Won’t you please, please, Boof, please?
And now the staff has changed in, oh, so many ways
Johan Santana somehow vanished in the haze
But every now and then I see Mr. Bonser
I know that we just need him like we’ve never done before
Boof, oh, yes, you can strike them all out
And you’ll keep the Twins from losing in a rout
Boof, what did you do with all those pounds?
Won’t you please, please, Boof, please?
When he was younger, so much younger than today
He always thought he’d do his pitching out there by the Bay
But San Francisco thought they needed A.J. more
And now they find they’ve changed their mind, and runs they now can’t score
Boof, oh, yes he can keep the ball down
And he’ll get them all to hit it on the ground
Boof can keep the bullpen safe and sound
Won’t you please, please, Boof, please?
Boof, please?
Boof, please?
Ooooo
It's a low-risk pickup for the Red Sox, and he certainly would be a reasonable fit as the long reliever at the end of the bullpen. After the trade of Justin Masterson at the end of July, the Red Sox really didn't have anyone in their bullpen capable of taking over in the fifth inning and pitching the rest of the way.
Manny Delcarmen and Ramon Ramirez made 20 and 15 appearances, respectively, in games in which the Red Sox already led or trailed by four or more runs, and Hideki Okajima even made eight appearances in what could be considered a mop-up role. Takashi Saito spent most of the season as the team's designated mop-up reliever, but even Saito pitched more than one inning just six times all season.
Bonser has a career strikeout-to-walk ratio of 2.54 and has had quite a bit of success (.247/.296/.404) against righties, so he could be a nice fit at the back end of the Red Sox bullpen.
If he's not, well, he'll probably be released in spring training without having cost the Red Sox all that much money. He's arbitration-eligible this winter and will be awarded a salary somewhere in the $1 million range, but if the Red Sox cut him before the season begins, he'll be entitled only to 45 days' termination pay.
***
Just for fun: A couple of years ago, when I was working at the St. Cloud Times in central Minnesota, a coworker and I tackled a completely pointless project -- writing songs about Twins players to the tune of Beatles songs. Pitcher Nick Blackburn, whose name fits nicely into the tune of "Blackbird," inspired the project, but more than 30 followed after that.
Writing a Beatles parody about Bonser especially seems to fit given that his given name at birth actually was John Paul Bonser. He had it legally changed to Boof back in 2001.
Anyway, the below song is a bit outdated since the Red Sox likely see Bonser as a last-arm-in-the-bullpen type of guy rather than a starting pitcher. He also hasn't been as productive as he was expected to be when this song was written back two years ago.
But why should that stop us? Enjoy.
Boof (to the tune of "Help!")
Boof!
I need a starter!
Boof!
Not just any starter!
Boof!
You know I need six innings!
Booooooooof!
When he was younger, so much younger than today
He couldn’t seem to win and had a lousy ERA
And now those pounds are gone; he feels way more mature
Now he finds, his curve is fine, his wins are more assured
Boof, oh, yes he can keep the ball down
And he’ll get them all to hit it on the ground
Boof can keep the bullpen safe and sound
Won’t you please, please, Boof, please?
And now the staff has changed in, oh, so many ways
Johan Santana somehow vanished in the haze
But every now and then I see Mr. Bonser
I know that we just need him like we’ve never done before
Boof, oh, yes, you can strike them all out
And you’ll keep the Twins from losing in a rout
Boof, what did you do with all those pounds?
Won’t you please, please, Boof, please?
When he was younger, so much younger than today
He always thought he’d do his pitching out there by the Bay
But San Francisco thought they needed A.J. more
And now they find they’ve changed their mind, and runs they now can’t score
Boof, oh, yes he can keep the ball down
And he’ll get them all to hit it on the ground
Boof can keep the bullpen safe and sound
Won’t you please, please, Boof, please?
Boof, please?
Boof, please?
Ooooo
Thursday, December 10, 2009
Lowell deal gives Red Sox tremendous infield 'D'
And that's even without a move to sign Adrian Beltre.
Mike Lowell reportedly has been shipped to Texas in a deal for minor-leaguer Max Ramirez, a catcher/first base-type who can hit for power and who could probably be ready for a platoon with David Ortiz this spring.
(Red Sox blog Surviving Grady might put the Ramirez acquisition in the best terms: "This is, of course, part of Theo's "If I can't have Hanley Ramirez, by God, I'll sign everyone else in baseball named Ramirez" master plan, which just keeps picking up speed.")
Theo Epstein has plenty of time to keep making moves.
If this is his final move of the offseason that involves his infield, though, he's turned a below-average defensive infield into a tremendous defensive infield. A year ago, the offensive-minded Red Sox saw opposing batters hit .244 when they hit the ball on the ground -- a tick above the American League average of .240. The defensive-minded Seattle Mariners, playing most of the season with Beltre at third base, saw opponents hit .227 when they hit the ball on the ground.
Oh, and the move hasn't cost the Red Sox too much at the plate, either. Consider this player-by-player comparison:
Player A, 2008-09: .282/.337/.468 (.805)
Player B, 2008-09: .270/.333/.398 (.730)
Player A is Mike Lowell.
Player B is Casey Kotchman, who bounced around between three teams and had to adapt to a reserve role during the second half of last season. Their on-base percentages still are almost identical.
Kotchman, of course, would play first base every day for the Red Sox if the season started today, and Kevin Youkilis would play third base every day. Dustin Pedroia would play second base, and Marco Scutaro would play shortstop. (Not the other way around.)
Kotchman is an elite defensive first baseman, according to his Fielding Bible numbers (from BillJamesOnline.net):
2007: 18 runs saved (2nd in major leagues)
2008: 10 runs saved (5th in major leagues)
2009: 7 runs saved (7th in major leagues)
(Keep in mind Kotchman played only sparingly over the final two months of the season, too, after his July 31 trade to the Red Sox.)
Only Albert Pujols has consistently been a better defensive first baseman over the last three seasons than Kotchman.
And this is the worst-case scenario.
It's more likely that Epstein already has the parameters of a deal with slick-fielding third baseman Adrian Beltre, a move that would upgrade the Red Sox defensively even more. Youkilis then would move back to first base, and the Red Sox would have four infielders who are among the best in baseball at their respective positions.
Merry Christmas, Clay Buchholz.
Beltre, as previously discussed here, is not a crippling downgrade from Lowell at the plate. During the last two seasons, Beltre has an OPS of .739 -- but he played his home games at Safeco Field, a stadium that does little to reward the power of righthanded hitters.
(This is why the Mariners don't seem to see Jason Bay as a fit.)
The upgrade from Lowell to Beltre in the field seems to be more than enough to compensate for the difference. Beltre was credited with having saved 21 runs last season by John Dewan's Fielding Bible system, and Lowell was charged with having cost the Red Sox 17 runs last season. That's a difference of almost 40 runs -- or, since 10 runs is roughly equivalent to a win, almost four wins.
That's why, according to FanGraphs' Wins Above Replacement statistics, Beltre would be an enormous upgrade on Lowell even without a bounce-back year at the plate:
Lowell, 2008/09: 3.2/1.2 -- 4.4 WAR
Beltre, 2008/09: 4.1/2.4 -- 6.5 WAR
What's most interesting is the fact that the Red Sox will absorb so much money to get rid of Lowell. The veteran still had plenty of value as a platoon-style designated hitter with David Ortiz -- albeit at the cost of a roster spot -- but Epstein (and Terry Francona) must have believed Lowell wouldn't be his same positive clubhouse presence if he was relegated to such a role.
Either that, or Epstein has so much respect for Lowell that he made sure to find him a landing where he could play on something of a regular basis.
He probably won't play much third base for Texas.
As long as he's not playing third base for Boston, though, the Red Sox are going to be a significantly better defensive team.
Mike Lowell reportedly has been shipped to Texas in a deal for minor-leaguer Max Ramirez, a catcher/first base-type who can hit for power and who could probably be ready for a platoon with David Ortiz this spring.
(Red Sox blog Surviving Grady might put the Ramirez acquisition in the best terms: "This is, of course, part of Theo's "If I can't have Hanley Ramirez, by God, I'll sign everyone else in baseball named Ramirez" master plan, which just keeps picking up speed.")
Theo Epstein has plenty of time to keep making moves.
If this is his final move of the offseason that involves his infield, though, he's turned a below-average defensive infield into a tremendous defensive infield. A year ago, the offensive-minded Red Sox saw opposing batters hit .244 when they hit the ball on the ground -- a tick above the American League average of .240. The defensive-minded Seattle Mariners, playing most of the season with Beltre at third base, saw opponents hit .227 when they hit the ball on the ground.
Oh, and the move hasn't cost the Red Sox too much at the plate, either. Consider this player-by-player comparison:
Player A, 2008-09: .282/.337/.468 (.805)
Player B, 2008-09: .270/.333/.398 (.730)
Player A is Mike Lowell.
Player B is Casey Kotchman, who bounced around between three teams and had to adapt to a reserve role during the second half of last season. Their on-base percentages still are almost identical.
Kotchman, of course, would play first base every day for the Red Sox if the season started today, and Kevin Youkilis would play third base every day. Dustin Pedroia would play second base, and Marco Scutaro would play shortstop. (Not the other way around.)
Kotchman is an elite defensive first baseman, according to his Fielding Bible numbers (from BillJamesOnline.net):
2007: 18 runs saved (2nd in major leagues)
2008: 10 runs saved (5th in major leagues)
2009: 7 runs saved (7th in major leagues)
(Keep in mind Kotchman played only sparingly over the final two months of the season, too, after his July 31 trade to the Red Sox.)
Only Albert Pujols has consistently been a better defensive first baseman over the last three seasons than Kotchman.
And this is the worst-case scenario.
It's more likely that Epstein already has the parameters of a deal with slick-fielding third baseman Adrian Beltre, a move that would upgrade the Red Sox defensively even more. Youkilis then would move back to first base, and the Red Sox would have four infielders who are among the best in baseball at their respective positions.
Merry Christmas, Clay Buchholz.
Beltre, as previously discussed here, is not a crippling downgrade from Lowell at the plate. During the last two seasons, Beltre has an OPS of .739 -- but he played his home games at Safeco Field, a stadium that does little to reward the power of righthanded hitters.
(This is why the Mariners don't seem to see Jason Bay as a fit.)
The upgrade from Lowell to Beltre in the field seems to be more than enough to compensate for the difference. Beltre was credited with having saved 21 runs last season by John Dewan's Fielding Bible system, and Lowell was charged with having cost the Red Sox 17 runs last season. That's a difference of almost 40 runs -- or, since 10 runs is roughly equivalent to a win, almost four wins.
That's why, according to FanGraphs' Wins Above Replacement statistics, Beltre would be an enormous upgrade on Lowell even without a bounce-back year at the plate:
Lowell, 2008/09: 3.2/1.2 -- 4.4 WAR
Beltre, 2008/09: 4.1/2.4 -- 6.5 WAR
What's most interesting is the fact that the Red Sox will absorb so much money to get rid of Lowell. The veteran still had plenty of value as a platoon-style designated hitter with David Ortiz -- albeit at the cost of a roster spot -- but Epstein (and Terry Francona) must have believed Lowell wouldn't be his same positive clubhouse presence if he was relegated to such a role.
Either that, or Epstein has so much respect for Lowell that he made sure to find him a landing where he could play on something of a regular basis.
He probably won't play much third base for Texas.
As long as he's not playing third base for Boston, though, the Red Sox are going to be a significantly better defensive team.
Why the Red Sox shouldn't overreact
To take things a step further: Writers and radio talk-show hosts alike are starting to clamor for Theo Epstein to do something big this offseason because the Yankees are pulling away.
They're wrong.
In fact, it's pretty easy to demonstrate why the Red Sox already are vastly improved over the team they fielded on Opening Day last season -- a deal for Jason Bay or an adequate replacement notwithstanding.
Hold onto your hats: We're going to do this using the Wins Above Replacement statistic. The statistic itself is more complex than the NFL's quarterback rating, but here's the basic gist: It calculates how many runs a player produces at the plate and how many runs a player prevents in the field. You then compare this number to the number of runs an average player at that particular position would have produced and prevented.
Every 10 extra runs produced or prevented, people who are smarter than me have figured out, tends to turn into one extra win -- hence Wins Above Replacement. Voila.
The beauty of WAR is that it's cumulative. A guy who hits .300 and play 100 games is less valuable than a guy who hits .300 and plays 120 games. A relief pitcher with a 2.00 ERA in 70 innings is less valuable than a starting pitcher with a 4.00 ERA in 200 innings. (Really. We can go over it if you'd like.)
It's tough to quantify with other statistics just how significant it is that the Red Sox go from four months of Jason Varitek and two months of Victor Martinez to six months of Martinez. But because WAR is cumulative, we actually can add up four months of Varitek and two months of Martinez and add them together and compare them to six months of Martinez.
(This is, of course, all based on last season's numbers. But no one other than maybe Marco Scutaro seemed to have a career year and is due for a precipitous fall, and no one -- I'm looking at you, David Ortiz -- seems all that likely to have a huge bounce-back year that would skew the numbers dramatically.)
Catcher
2009, Varitek/Martinez: 2.4
(To do this, you have to take two-thirds of Varitek's 2009 WAR total and add it to one-third of Martinez's 2009 WAR total since he only played in Boston in August and September.)
2010, Martinez: 4.9
First base
Second base
Third base
All constants. If the Red Sox replace Mike Lowell with Adrian Beltre, that's an upgrade from 1.2 WAR to 2.4 WAR based mostly on the defense of the two respective players.
Shortstop
2009, Nick Green/Alex Gonzalez: 0.6
(The formula here is Green for four months plus Gonzalez for two months. This actually is even more generous than it appears because Julio Lugo managed a negative WAR in his tenure in Boston before he was designated for assignment.)
2010, Scutaro: 4.5
(Need another reminder why Scutaro is such an important pickup for the Red Sox? Even if he regresses to his numbers from two seasons ago, he's still at 2.7 and a two-win upgrade over the Green/Gonzalez duo of a year ago.)
Right field
Center field
Both constants.
Left field
2009, Jason Bay: 3.1
2010, Who knows?
Victor Martinez for an entire season in place of Victor Martinez for one-third of a season is a monster upgrade. Scutaro in place of Nick Green is another monster upgrade. That's the case -- and we can't emphasize this enough -- even if he regresses. Those two moves alone are worth at least five wins to the Red Sox.
If the Red Sox lose Bay, they'll need to make a move to replace him.
(It seems increasingly unlikely they'll lose Bay, by the way. The Angels have said they're out. The Mariners and their defense-first philosophy don't seem to be a fit. The Yankees always are lurking, but they've also made noise about keeping their payroll within reason. Who else is there? He ain't going back to Pittsburgh.)
If they do bring back Bay, there's no reason to go out and do something silly just because the Yankees made a trade for a center fielder.
They're wrong.
In fact, it's pretty easy to demonstrate why the Red Sox already are vastly improved over the team they fielded on Opening Day last season -- a deal for Jason Bay or an adequate replacement notwithstanding.
Hold onto your hats: We're going to do this using the Wins Above Replacement statistic. The statistic itself is more complex than the NFL's quarterback rating, but here's the basic gist: It calculates how many runs a player produces at the plate and how many runs a player prevents in the field. You then compare this number to the number of runs an average player at that particular position would have produced and prevented.
Every 10 extra runs produced or prevented, people who are smarter than me have figured out, tends to turn into one extra win -- hence Wins Above Replacement. Voila.
The beauty of WAR is that it's cumulative. A guy who hits .300 and play 100 games is less valuable than a guy who hits .300 and plays 120 games. A relief pitcher with a 2.00 ERA in 70 innings is less valuable than a starting pitcher with a 4.00 ERA in 200 innings. (Really. We can go over it if you'd like.)
It's tough to quantify with other statistics just how significant it is that the Red Sox go from four months of Jason Varitek and two months of Victor Martinez to six months of Martinez. But because WAR is cumulative, we actually can add up four months of Varitek and two months of Martinez and add them together and compare them to six months of Martinez.
(This is, of course, all based on last season's numbers. But no one other than maybe Marco Scutaro seemed to have a career year and is due for a precipitous fall, and no one -- I'm looking at you, David Ortiz -- seems all that likely to have a huge bounce-back year that would skew the numbers dramatically.)
Catcher
2009, Varitek/Martinez: 2.4
(To do this, you have to take two-thirds of Varitek's 2009 WAR total and add it to one-third of Martinez's 2009 WAR total since he only played in Boston in August and September.)
2010, Martinez: 4.9
First base
Second base
Third base
All constants. If the Red Sox replace Mike Lowell with Adrian Beltre, that's an upgrade from 1.2 WAR to 2.4 WAR based mostly on the defense of the two respective players.
Shortstop
2009, Nick Green/Alex Gonzalez: 0.6
(The formula here is Green for four months plus Gonzalez for two months. This actually is even more generous than it appears because Julio Lugo managed a negative WAR in his tenure in Boston before he was designated for assignment.)
2010, Scutaro: 4.5
(Need another reminder why Scutaro is such an important pickup for the Red Sox? Even if he regresses to his numbers from two seasons ago, he's still at 2.7 and a two-win upgrade over the Green/Gonzalez duo of a year ago.)
Right field
Center field
Both constants.
Left field
2009, Jason Bay: 3.1
2010, Who knows?
Victor Martinez for an entire season in place of Victor Martinez for one-third of a season is a monster upgrade. Scutaro in place of Nick Green is another monster upgrade. That's the case -- and we can't emphasize this enough -- even if he regresses. Those two moves alone are worth at least five wins to the Red Sox.
If the Red Sox lose Bay, they'll need to make a move to replace him.
(It seems increasingly unlikely they'll lose Bay, by the way. The Angels have said they're out. The Mariners and their defense-first philosophy don't seem to be a fit. The Yankees always are lurking, but they've also made noise about keeping their payroll within reason. Who else is there? He ain't going back to Pittsburgh.)
If they do bring back Bay, there's no reason to go out and do something silly just because the Yankees made a trade for a center fielder.
Wednesday, December 9, 2009
Granderson not a significant upgrade for Yankees
Before Red Sox fans get all in a tizzy about the Yankees' acquisition of Curtis Granderson -- and, make no mistake, fans are in a tizzy -- let's take a step back and see what the trade actually does in terms of upgrading the Yankees at the plate and in the field next season.
(Here's a hint: It's not going to prompt the Red Sox to throw in the towel for next season.)
Granderson, in theory, will play center field for the Yankees next season and could hit either at the top of in the middle of the Yankees' lineup. He can hit home runs and steal bases, and he can play an above-average defensive center field. He'll displace Brett Gardner and Melky Cabrera in center field, and he'll probably displace the departed Hideki Matsui in the Yankees' lineup.
If Johnny Damon returns on a short-term contract to play left field, the Yankees likely would play Granderson in center field and Nick Swisher in right with Cabrera as the fourth outfielder -- and left fielder when Damon DH's.
Is that better than Damon-Cabrera-Swisher with Matsui DH'ing?
It might not be.
Let's look at it specifically in the context of Wins Above Replacement (WAR), a statistic that measures offensive and defensive impact to spit out a number that approximate how many wins a team would win with that player on its team rather than a typical Triple-A call-up.
Granderson had a WAR of 3.4 last season, a significant decline from his career-best WAR of 7.4 two seasons ago. His numbers have declined across the board -- with the exception of his home-run numbers -- in that span, and his numbers against lefties have been abysmal. A move to Yankee Stadium ought to help his power production, but there's no indication he's going to be a 7.0-plus type of player again anytime soon.
Matsui had a WAR of 2.4 last season even as a designated hitter thanks to his 28 home runs and .876 OPS in more than 500 plate appearances. It was the same number he posted two seasons ago.
Cabrera had a WAR of 1.6 last season as he matched a career high in OPS (.752) and set a career high in home runs (13).
Gardner had a WAR of 2.1 last season in large part because he had such a terrific defensive season in center field. The 26-year-old started 63 games in center field and made appearances in 36 more, putting up an Ultimate Zone Rating of 7.2 -- better, actually, than Granderson.
Adding Granderson is a plus-3.4 move in a vaccuum -- and maybe a little bit more if he can bounce back. But Matsui, Cabrera and Gardner combined for a WAR of 6.1 last season, and all three either will depart or see their roles dramatically reduced -- meaning the Yankees have to find a plus-3.0 player to make up the difference. If they do that -- and they've shown no interest thus far in Jason Bay or Matt Holliday, though that could change in a hurry -- they'll have upgraded their team significantly.
But if Cabrera is the left fielder and Damon is the designated hitter, well, the Yankees might actually have taken a small step backwards.
(Here's a hint: It's not going to prompt the Red Sox to throw in the towel for next season.)
Granderson, in theory, will play center field for the Yankees next season and could hit either at the top of in the middle of the Yankees' lineup. He can hit home runs and steal bases, and he can play an above-average defensive center field. He'll displace Brett Gardner and Melky Cabrera in center field, and he'll probably displace the departed Hideki Matsui in the Yankees' lineup.
If Johnny Damon returns on a short-term contract to play left field, the Yankees likely would play Granderson in center field and Nick Swisher in right with Cabrera as the fourth outfielder -- and left fielder when Damon DH's.
Is that better than Damon-Cabrera-Swisher with Matsui DH'ing?
It might not be.
Let's look at it specifically in the context of Wins Above Replacement (WAR), a statistic that measures offensive and defensive impact to spit out a number that approximate how many wins a team would win with that player on its team rather than a typical Triple-A call-up.
Granderson had a WAR of 3.4 last season, a significant decline from his career-best WAR of 7.4 two seasons ago. His numbers have declined across the board -- with the exception of his home-run numbers -- in that span, and his numbers against lefties have been abysmal. A move to Yankee Stadium ought to help his power production, but there's no indication he's going to be a 7.0-plus type of player again anytime soon.
Matsui had a WAR of 2.4 last season even as a designated hitter thanks to his 28 home runs and .876 OPS in more than 500 plate appearances. It was the same number he posted two seasons ago.
Cabrera had a WAR of 1.6 last season as he matched a career high in OPS (.752) and set a career high in home runs (13).
Gardner had a WAR of 2.1 last season in large part because he had such a terrific defensive season in center field. The 26-year-old started 63 games in center field and made appearances in 36 more, putting up an Ultimate Zone Rating of 7.2 -- better, actually, than Granderson.
Adding Granderson is a plus-3.4 move in a vaccuum -- and maybe a little bit more if he can bounce back. But Matsui, Cabrera and Gardner combined for a WAR of 6.1 last season, and all three either will depart or see their roles dramatically reduced -- meaning the Yankees have to find a plus-3.0 player to make up the difference. If they do that -- and they've shown no interest thus far in Jason Bay or Matt Holliday, though that could change in a hurry -- they'll have upgraded their team significantly.
But if Cabrera is the left fielder and Damon is the designated hitter, well, the Yankees might actually have taken a small step backwards.
Tuesday, December 8, 2009
Mayo not in a position to make plays
Bill Belichick hasn't always had the best defensive players.
Belichick has, however, always had a knack for putting his best defensive players in a position to make the most plays -- especially his linebackers. That's why it's so perplexing to see that Belichick hasn't put Jerod Mayo -- easily the Patriots' best linebacker and maybe the Patriots' best defensive player, period -- in a position to make plays.
The second-year linebacker finished with a team-best 12 tackles and half a sack on Sunday against Miami, but a re-examination of the game tape reveals very little in the way of the game-changing plays the Patriots need from their best defensive players.
Mayo is a run-stopping linebacker, first and foremost. He's not a pass-rusher off the edge like Tully Banta-Cain. His job is to read the gaps on either side of nose tackle Vince Wilfork and hit the running back before he can get through those gaps. The more a team runs the ball, the more chances he has to make plays.
But when a team throws the ball -- and Indianapolis, New Orleans and Miami have thrown the ball with tremendous effectiveness against the Patriots -- that leaves Mayo without a defined role. A coach like Belichick still ought to be able to put his best players in position to make an impact, but he hasn't done so thus far.
By one unofficial count, of the 53 times Chad Henne dropped back to pass, Mayo dropped into zone pass coverage 36 times. But when Mayo dropped into coverage, he normally did so in the middle of the field -- and that gave Henne freedom to throw to pick on the cornerbacks on either side. Think of it this way: Ever-improving safety Brandon Meriweather, to use a baseball term, played deep center field -- and Mayo played a shallow center field. Neither could do very much about anything Henne threw outside the hash marks on either side.
Even when Henne threw the ball inside the hash marks, Mayo didn't react in time to break up the passes. He took a step in the wrong direction on a 15-yard pass to Brian Hartline early in the second quarter, a key third-down pickup that eventually led to the Dolphins' first touchdown. Davone Bess caught a shot pass on a third-and-4 snap on the Dolphins' next drive and capitalized on a missed tackle by Mayo to run for 14 yards.
Dropping Mayo into zone coverage in the middle of the field, in effect, usually took the linebacker completely out of the play.
And in rushing on a half-dozen delayed blitzes, Mayo still found himself caught in no-man's land. On the fourth-and-6 snap that could have iced the game, an obvious passing situation, Mayo followed Henne as he rolled toward the sidelines but never made a serious effort to go after him. It was almost as if he was defending against a scramble -- something Henne has done only eight times all season. Henne had plenty of time to wait for Greg Camarillo to run his hitch route and come back to the ball -- in one-on-one coverage, of course -- for a 13-yard gain.
On a third-and-10 snap earlier in the fourth quarter, Mayo tore through his assigned gap on a delayed blitz only to see Henne throw the ball right through him -- inches from his outstretched hand -- for a 15-yard pass to Ted Ginn. Mayo had responsibility for that gap, and he failed to bat the ball down.
Mayo isn't exactly lacking in versatility. Belichick even lined him up at nose tackle -- he had his hand on the ground and everything -- on a third-and-4 snap early in the third quarter. He remains one of the game's elite run-stopping linebackers, too, as evidenced by his third-and-2 tackle of running back Lex Hilliard late in the third quarter.
But he's done his best work against the run -- and the more the Patriots' secondary struggles, the less other teams are going to run. Opponents are averaging 37.8 pass attempts in the Patriots' five losses but only 28.9 pass attempts in the Patriots' seven wins -- exactly the opposite of what you'd normally expect.
If other teams are going to keep throwing the ball against the Patriots, Belichick is going to have to find a way to turn Mayo into a playmaker when they do.
Belichick has, however, always had a knack for putting his best defensive players in a position to make the most plays -- especially his linebackers. That's why it's so perplexing to see that Belichick hasn't put Jerod Mayo -- easily the Patriots' best linebacker and maybe the Patriots' best defensive player, period -- in a position to make plays.
The second-year linebacker finished with a team-best 12 tackles and half a sack on Sunday against Miami, but a re-examination of the game tape reveals very little in the way of the game-changing plays the Patriots need from their best defensive players.
Mayo is a run-stopping linebacker, first and foremost. He's not a pass-rusher off the edge like Tully Banta-Cain. His job is to read the gaps on either side of nose tackle Vince Wilfork and hit the running back before he can get through those gaps. The more a team runs the ball, the more chances he has to make plays.
But when a team throws the ball -- and Indianapolis, New Orleans and Miami have thrown the ball with tremendous effectiveness against the Patriots -- that leaves Mayo without a defined role. A coach like Belichick still ought to be able to put his best players in position to make an impact, but he hasn't done so thus far.
By one unofficial count, of the 53 times Chad Henne dropped back to pass, Mayo dropped into zone pass coverage 36 times. But when Mayo dropped into coverage, he normally did so in the middle of the field -- and that gave Henne freedom to throw to pick on the cornerbacks on either side. Think of it this way: Ever-improving safety Brandon Meriweather, to use a baseball term, played deep center field -- and Mayo played a shallow center field. Neither could do very much about anything Henne threw outside the hash marks on either side.
Even when Henne threw the ball inside the hash marks, Mayo didn't react in time to break up the passes. He took a step in the wrong direction on a 15-yard pass to Brian Hartline early in the second quarter, a key third-down pickup that eventually led to the Dolphins' first touchdown. Davone Bess caught a shot pass on a third-and-4 snap on the Dolphins' next drive and capitalized on a missed tackle by Mayo to run for 14 yards.
Dropping Mayo into zone coverage in the middle of the field, in effect, usually took the linebacker completely out of the play.
And in rushing on a half-dozen delayed blitzes, Mayo still found himself caught in no-man's land. On the fourth-and-6 snap that could have iced the game, an obvious passing situation, Mayo followed Henne as he rolled toward the sidelines but never made a serious effort to go after him. It was almost as if he was defending against a scramble -- something Henne has done only eight times all season. Henne had plenty of time to wait for Greg Camarillo to run his hitch route and come back to the ball -- in one-on-one coverage, of course -- for a 13-yard gain.
On a third-and-10 snap earlier in the fourth quarter, Mayo tore through his assigned gap on a delayed blitz only to see Henne throw the ball right through him -- inches from his outstretched hand -- for a 15-yard pass to Ted Ginn. Mayo had responsibility for that gap, and he failed to bat the ball down.
Mayo isn't exactly lacking in versatility. Belichick even lined him up at nose tackle -- he had his hand on the ground and everything -- on a third-and-4 snap early in the third quarter. He remains one of the game's elite run-stopping linebackers, too, as evidenced by his third-and-2 tackle of running back Lex Hilliard late in the third quarter.
But he's done his best work against the run -- and the more the Patriots' secondary struggles, the less other teams are going to run. Opponents are averaging 37.8 pass attempts in the Patriots' five losses but only 28.9 pass attempts in the Patriots' seven wins -- exactly the opposite of what you'd normally expect.
If other teams are going to keep throwing the ball against the Patriots, Belichick is going to have to find a way to turn Mayo into a playmaker when they do.
Monday, December 7, 2009
The Patriots really aren't that good
It's the popular idea today: The Patriots didn't necessarily do anything egregiously wrong in their loss at Miami on Sunday. The Patriots don't necessarily have some sort of mental block when it comes to winning on the road. The Patriots aren't necessarily gag artists who can't live up to expectations.
The Patriots might just not be all that good.
Given the numerous factors that go into winning and losing football games, it's a tough theory to try to prove. With help from our friends at ProFootballFocus.com, though, we'll give it a shot. Here's a position-by-position look -- with stats up to date entering play entering play in Week 13 and thus not including Week 13 -- at how the Patriots rank when compared to their counterparts around the NFL:
(Note: The PFF.com rankings include every aspect of the game -- meaning wide receivers are evaluated on their run-blocking as well as their pass-catching, and linebackers are evaluated on their pass coverage as well as their tackling.)
Center
1. Ryan Kalil, Carolina
2. Nick Mangold, N.Y. Jets
3. Jake Grove, Miami
13. Dan Koppen, New England
Guard
1. Jahri Evans, New Orleans
2. Steve Neal, New England
3. Carl Nicks, New Orleans
12. Logan Mankins, New England
Tackle
1. Joe Thomas, Cleveland
2. Willie Colon, Pittsburgh
3. Jake Long, Miami
5. Sebastian Vollmer, New England
14. Nick Kaczur, New England
45. Matt Light, New England
Tight end
1. Kevin Boss, N.Y. Giants
2. Jason Witten, Dallas
3. Dallas Clark, Indianapolis
18. Chris Baker, New England
33. Ben Watson, New England
Wide receiver
1. Reggie Wayne, Indianapolis
2. Larry Fitzgerald, Arizona
3. Vincent Jackson, San Diego
9. Wes Welker, New England
18. Randy Moss, New England
45. Sam Aiken, New England
Running back
1. Maurice Jones-Drew, Jacksonville
2. Ray Rice, Baltimore
3. Ricky Williams, Miami
9. Kevin Faulk, New England
49. Laurence Maroney, New England
Quarterback
1. Drew Brees, New Orleans
2. Brett Favre, Minnesota
3. Peyton Manning, Indianapolis
10. Tom Brady, New England
Offensive analysis: The Patriots have two players who rank among the top five at their position in the NFL. Both -- Neal and Vollmer -- were injured against Miami. Wes Welker remains a playmaking machine. Brady ranks ahead of names like Carson Palmer, Eli Manning and Joe Flacco but behind David Garrard, Kurt Warner and Matt Schaub.
3-4 defensive end
1. Justin Smith, San Francisco
2. Randy Starks, Miami
3. Corey Williams, Cleveland
11. Ty Warren, New England
(Neither Jarvis Green nor Mike Wright has played enough snaps at 3-4 end to qualify.)
Defensive tackle
1. Kevin Williams, Minnesota
2. Kelly Gregg, Baltimore
3. Vince Wilfork, New England
3-4 outside linebacker
1. DeMarcus Ware, Dallas
2. James Harrison, Pittsburgh
3. Tully Banta-Cain, New England
Inside linebacker
1. Ray Lewis, Baltimore
2. Patrick Willis, San Francisco
3. Nick Barnett, Green Bay
33. Gary Guyton, New England
39. Jerod Mayo, New England
Cornerback
1. Charles Woodson, Green Bay
2. Darrelle Revis, N.Y. Jets
3. Antoine Winfield, Minnesota
14. Leigh Bodden, New England
61. Darius Butler, New England
68. Shawn Springs, New England
81. Jonathan Wilhite, New England
Safety
1. Ed Reed, Baltimore
2. Reed Doughty, Washington
3. Nick Collins, Green Bay
14. Brandon Meriweather, New England
68. Brandon McGowan, New England
Defensive analysis: The dismal rankings of the Patriots' cornerbacks shouldn't be surprising. Whoever it is that watches film for ProFootballFocus.com, though, also is having a tough time finding impact plays made either by Mayo or McGowan. The disappearance of Mayo in particular -- he has 64 tackles in nine games this season, but raise your hand if you remember the last impact play he made -- might be one of the most under-discussed subplots of the Patriots' collapse. That might be worth a separate film breakdown and discussion in this space.
Credit should go to Tully Banta-Cain, however, who really is having a Pro Bowl-caliber year rushing the passer. Entering play Sunday, PFF.com had credited Banta-Cain with five sacks, seven hits on the quarterback and 13 pressures -- and he'd missed just two tackles all season.
The Patriots might just not be all that good.
Given the numerous factors that go into winning and losing football games, it's a tough theory to try to prove. With help from our friends at ProFootballFocus.com, though, we'll give it a shot. Here's a position-by-position look -- with stats up to date entering play entering play in Week 13 and thus not including Week 13 -- at how the Patriots rank when compared to their counterparts around the NFL:
(Note: The PFF.com rankings include every aspect of the game -- meaning wide receivers are evaluated on their run-blocking as well as their pass-catching, and linebackers are evaluated on their pass coverage as well as their tackling.)
Center
1. Ryan Kalil, Carolina
2. Nick Mangold, N.Y. Jets
3. Jake Grove, Miami
13. Dan Koppen, New England
Guard
1. Jahri Evans, New Orleans
2. Steve Neal, New England
3. Carl Nicks, New Orleans
12. Logan Mankins, New England
Tackle
1. Joe Thomas, Cleveland
2. Willie Colon, Pittsburgh
3. Jake Long, Miami
5. Sebastian Vollmer, New England
14. Nick Kaczur, New England
45. Matt Light, New England
Tight end
1. Kevin Boss, N.Y. Giants
2. Jason Witten, Dallas
3. Dallas Clark, Indianapolis
18. Chris Baker, New England
33. Ben Watson, New England
Wide receiver
1. Reggie Wayne, Indianapolis
2. Larry Fitzgerald, Arizona
3. Vincent Jackson, San Diego
9. Wes Welker, New England
18. Randy Moss, New England
45. Sam Aiken, New England
Running back
1. Maurice Jones-Drew, Jacksonville
2. Ray Rice, Baltimore
3. Ricky Williams, Miami
9. Kevin Faulk, New England
49. Laurence Maroney, New England
Quarterback
1. Drew Brees, New Orleans
2. Brett Favre, Minnesota
3. Peyton Manning, Indianapolis
10. Tom Brady, New England
Offensive analysis: The Patriots have two players who rank among the top five at their position in the NFL. Both -- Neal and Vollmer -- were injured against Miami. Wes Welker remains a playmaking machine. Brady ranks ahead of names like Carson Palmer, Eli Manning and Joe Flacco but behind David Garrard, Kurt Warner and Matt Schaub.
3-4 defensive end
1. Justin Smith, San Francisco
2. Randy Starks, Miami
3. Corey Williams, Cleveland
11. Ty Warren, New England
(Neither Jarvis Green nor Mike Wright has played enough snaps at 3-4 end to qualify.)
Defensive tackle
1. Kevin Williams, Minnesota
2. Kelly Gregg, Baltimore
3. Vince Wilfork, New England
3-4 outside linebacker
1. DeMarcus Ware, Dallas
2. James Harrison, Pittsburgh
3. Tully Banta-Cain, New England
Inside linebacker
1. Ray Lewis, Baltimore
2. Patrick Willis, San Francisco
3. Nick Barnett, Green Bay
33. Gary Guyton, New England
39. Jerod Mayo, New England
Cornerback
1. Charles Woodson, Green Bay
2. Darrelle Revis, N.Y. Jets
3. Antoine Winfield, Minnesota
14. Leigh Bodden, New England
61. Darius Butler, New England
68. Shawn Springs, New England
81. Jonathan Wilhite, New England
Safety
1. Ed Reed, Baltimore
2. Reed Doughty, Washington
3. Nick Collins, Green Bay
14. Brandon Meriweather, New England
68. Brandon McGowan, New England
Defensive analysis: The dismal rankings of the Patriots' cornerbacks shouldn't be surprising. Whoever it is that watches film for ProFootballFocus.com, though, also is having a tough time finding impact plays made either by Mayo or McGowan. The disappearance of Mayo in particular -- he has 64 tackles in nine games this season, but raise your hand if you remember the last impact play he made -- might be one of the most under-discussed subplots of the Patriots' collapse. That might be worth a separate film breakdown and discussion in this space.
Credit should go to Tully Banta-Cain, however, who really is having a Pro Bowl-caliber year rushing the passer. Entering play Sunday, PFF.com had credited Banta-Cain with five sacks, seven hits on the quarterback and 13 pressures -- and he'd missed just two tackles all season.
Sunday, December 6, 2009
Scutaro should thrive at Fenway Park
"He hits the ball to all fields, but he's got his power to the pull side, which should play well here at Fenway Park."
-- Theo Epstein on Marco Scutaro
Something funny jumps out when looking at the home-road splits for Marco Scutaro from last season, the best season of his career. Unlike most players -- but like many of the players on his Toronto team -- Scutaro was a significantly better hitter on the road last season than he was at home:
Scutaro
Home: .242 batting/.353 on-base/.389 slugging
Road: .322 batting/.405 on-base/.429 slugging
Blue Jays
Home: .259 batting/.330 on-base/.439 slugging
Road: .273 batting/.335 on-base/.441 slugging
About all the Blue Jays did better at home than on the road was draw walks. The Blue Jays struck out less and hit for more power and scored more runs, period, away from Rogers Centre than they did at Rogers Centre.
The Red Sox aren't necessarily looking for a hitter who can thrive at Fenway Park. As discussed here repeatedly, the Red Sox don't need much help scoring runs at Fenway Park.
But if a guy who already can produce quality at-bats on the road can benefit from the proximity of the Green Monster, well, that's a nice little bonus.
Check out Scutaro's spray chart from home games in 2009...
... and from home games in 2008:
(We have to stick just to home games because MLB.com's hit charts only give you a stadium-by-stadium look rather than an overall look at an entire season.)
Check out the largest cluster of red letters -- fly outs -- in both charts. When Scutaro doesn't hit the ball hard, he tends to fly out weakly to short right field or center field. When he does hit the ball hard, however, he hits it to left field.
Does that remind you of anyone you know?
That's Dustin Pedroia.
A year ago, Pedroia OPS'ed .903 at home and .736 on the road. Scutaro, on the other hand, OPS'ed .743 at home at Rogers Centre, the ninth-friendliest park to hitters in the American League, but his OPS on the road was almost 100 points higher than that of Pedroia.
The 34-year-old Scutaro certainly might regress from his high-water mark of last season. The benefit of hitting at Fenway Park, though, might offset that regression.
-- Theo Epstein on Marco Scutaro
Something funny jumps out when looking at the home-road splits for Marco Scutaro from last season, the best season of his career. Unlike most players -- but like many of the players on his Toronto team -- Scutaro was a significantly better hitter on the road last season than he was at home:
Scutaro
Home: .242 batting/.353 on-base/.389 slugging
Road: .322 batting/.405 on-base/.429 slugging
Blue Jays
Home: .259 batting/.330 on-base/.439 slugging
Road: .273 batting/.335 on-base/.441 slugging
About all the Blue Jays did better at home than on the road was draw walks. The Blue Jays struck out less and hit for more power and scored more runs, period, away from Rogers Centre than they did at Rogers Centre.
The Red Sox aren't necessarily looking for a hitter who can thrive at Fenway Park. As discussed here repeatedly, the Red Sox don't need much help scoring runs at Fenway Park.
But if a guy who already can produce quality at-bats on the road can benefit from the proximity of the Green Monster, well, that's a nice little bonus.
Check out Scutaro's spray chart from home games in 2009...
... and from home games in 2008:
(We have to stick just to home games because MLB.com's hit charts only give you a stadium-by-stadium look rather than an overall look at an entire season.)
Check out the largest cluster of red letters -- fly outs -- in both charts. When Scutaro doesn't hit the ball hard, he tends to fly out weakly to short right field or center field. When he does hit the ball hard, however, he hits it to left field.
Does that remind you of anyone you know?
That's Dustin Pedroia.
A year ago, Pedroia OPS'ed .903 at home and .736 on the road. Scutaro, on the other hand, OPS'ed .743 at home at Rogers Centre, the ninth-friendliest park to hitters in the American League, but his OPS on the road was almost 100 points higher than that of Pedroia.
The 34-year-old Scutaro certainly might regress from his high-water mark of last season. The benefit of hitting at Fenway Park, though, might offset that regression.
Saturday, December 5, 2009
Nothing predictable about Lowell's health
Red Sox third baseman Mike Lowell told ESPNBoston.com he's not losing any sleep over the trade rumors swirling around him for the second straight winter.
But Lowell's health -- and thus his ability to play the defense he's played his entire career -- remains a huge question mark for the Red Sox. A team with an analytic process for just about everything can't do much more than guess at the range he'll have at third base next season.
"You just try monitor it as best you can and balance all the factors," Red Sox general manager Theo Epstein said on Friday. "There's no perfect way to predict how his defense will be. ... We'll see. It's something we'll continue to evaluate up to spring training and in spring training."
Team trainers paid Lowell a visit last week to monitor him during a regular workout, something they do routinely with players to keep lines of communication open. Most players take October and November off but begin their offseason workout programs in December, and a trainer or strength coach often will run a player through his workout program just to make sure it includes everything the team wants it to include.
Lowell now is more than a year removed from surgery to repair a torn labrum in his hip, an injury that seemed to impair severely his ability play his typical high level of defense. Consider his Ultimate Zone Rating numbers since his trade to Boston:
2006: 7.7
2007: 8.0
2008: 15.6
2009: minus-14.4
His Fielding Bible plus-minus numbers tell the same story:
2006: 6
2007: 7
2008: 7
2009: minus-23
Were Lowell five or 10 years younger, a return to form wouldn't even be a question. But the third baseman turns 36 years old in February and might have seen a decline in his skills -- albeit not one this precipitous -- even without his surgery.
Doctors predicted that Lowell would need an entire year to recovery fully from the operation, though, and that would seem to be a good omen for next season.
There's just no way to know for sure.
"That was what they said when they originally did the surgery: All the benefits wouldn't be seen until 2010," Epstein said. "We're certainly hoping that's the case."
But Lowell's health -- and thus his ability to play the defense he's played his entire career -- remains a huge question mark for the Red Sox. A team with an analytic process for just about everything can't do much more than guess at the range he'll have at third base next season.
"You just try monitor it as best you can and balance all the factors," Red Sox general manager Theo Epstein said on Friday. "There's no perfect way to predict how his defense will be. ... We'll see. It's something we'll continue to evaluate up to spring training and in spring training."
Team trainers paid Lowell a visit last week to monitor him during a regular workout, something they do routinely with players to keep lines of communication open. Most players take October and November off but begin their offseason workout programs in December, and a trainer or strength coach often will run a player through his workout program just to make sure it includes everything the team wants it to include.
Lowell now is more than a year removed from surgery to repair a torn labrum in his hip, an injury that seemed to impair severely his ability play his typical high level of defense. Consider his Ultimate Zone Rating numbers since his trade to Boston:
2006: 7.7
2007: 8.0
2008: 15.6
2009: minus-14.4
His Fielding Bible plus-minus numbers tell the same story:
2006: 6
2007: 7
2008: 7
2009: minus-23
Were Lowell five or 10 years younger, a return to form wouldn't even be a question. But the third baseman turns 36 years old in February and might have seen a decline in his skills -- albeit not one this precipitous -- even without his surgery.
Doctors predicted that Lowell would need an entire year to recovery fully from the operation, though, and that would seem to be a good omen for next season.
There's just no way to know for sure.
"That was what they said when they originally did the surgery: All the benefits wouldn't be seen until 2010," Epstein said. "We're certainly hoping that's the case."
Thursday, December 3, 2009
Scutaro deal leaves room for Lowrie
Marco Scutaro is on the verge of signing a two-year deal with the Red Sox, both ESPNBoston.com and the Boston Herald are reporting. The career utility infielder likely will go into next season as the starting shortstop and No. 8 or No. 9 hitter in the Red Sox lineup.
But that doesn't mean the Red Sox have given up on Jed Lowrie.
The wrist surgery Lowrie underwent in April turned last season into a lost season for the versatile infielder. A couple of rehab stints and a couple of returns to the major leagues yielded nothing but a hard-hit infield single to help win a dramatic game against the Angels in September.
"It’s something that you hope goes away as soon as possible, but the reality of it is it hasn’t," Lowrie told the Providence Journal this week. "The wrist and hand is so important to playing the game of baseball that it can’t be swept under the rug. It has to be something that’s addressed."
Don't forget: Lowrie didn't go into last season as the clear-cut starter at shortstop. With Julio Lugo still under contract and reportedly balking at filling a utility role, it actually seemed pretty likely for most of the spring that Lowrie would begin the season as Terry Francona's utility infielder.
With Scutaro on board, it seems likely that Lowrie will begin next season in the same role until he can demonstrate that his wrist is healthy. (He's not even swinging a bat yet, he told the Journal.)
That might not, however, last for all that long.
The Red Sox think very highly of Lowrie. They see him as Dustin Pedroia Lite, in some ways, a capable defensive player who can hit 40 or 50 doubles a season with an on-base percentage up over .350. They wouldn't have waited so patiently for him last season if they didn't see him as someone who could play shortstop for them for the next 10 years.
Scutaro, on the other hand, is a No. 9 hitter whose ability to work counts is his greatest asset at the plate. The building hype swirling around him might have built up expectations among fans, but if he draws his share of walks and plays consistent defense, he'll have done his job.
And while Scutaro likely has the job this season, he'll be 35 years old on Opening Day in 2011 -- at which time a presumably healthy Lowrie still will only be 26. Scutaro is fully capable of playing as many positions as Lowrie is, if not more, and would be a perfect fit as a utility guy if Lowrie demonstrates that he's ready to take over the job at shortstop long-term.
(There has been quite a bit of talk about Jose Iglesias this winter and how he'll be ready to take over in 2012. That, though, only means we've all forgotten the lesson of Lars Anderson -- and while no one here is giving up on Anderson, he's a warning sign to those who assume highly touted prospects always will skip merrily through the minor leagues.)
Scutaro is the Red Sox shortstop for the short-term, a slick-fielding defender who can work counts and get on base with any shortstop in the game. A two-year deal for Scutaro, though, doesn't necessarily mean a two-year wait for Lowrie.
But that doesn't mean the Red Sox have given up on Jed Lowrie.
The wrist surgery Lowrie underwent in April turned last season into a lost season for the versatile infielder. A couple of rehab stints and a couple of returns to the major leagues yielded nothing but a hard-hit infield single to help win a dramatic game against the Angels in September.
"It’s something that you hope goes away as soon as possible, but the reality of it is it hasn’t," Lowrie told the Providence Journal this week. "The wrist and hand is so important to playing the game of baseball that it can’t be swept under the rug. It has to be something that’s addressed."
Don't forget: Lowrie didn't go into last season as the clear-cut starter at shortstop. With Julio Lugo still under contract and reportedly balking at filling a utility role, it actually seemed pretty likely for most of the spring that Lowrie would begin the season as Terry Francona's utility infielder.
With Scutaro on board, it seems likely that Lowrie will begin next season in the same role until he can demonstrate that his wrist is healthy. (He's not even swinging a bat yet, he told the Journal.)
That might not, however, last for all that long.
The Red Sox think very highly of Lowrie. They see him as Dustin Pedroia Lite, in some ways, a capable defensive player who can hit 40 or 50 doubles a season with an on-base percentage up over .350. They wouldn't have waited so patiently for him last season if they didn't see him as someone who could play shortstop for them for the next 10 years.
Scutaro, on the other hand, is a No. 9 hitter whose ability to work counts is his greatest asset at the plate. The building hype swirling around him might have built up expectations among fans, but if he draws his share of walks and plays consistent defense, he'll have done his job.
And while Scutaro likely has the job this season, he'll be 35 years old on Opening Day in 2011 -- at which time a presumably healthy Lowrie still will only be 26. Scutaro is fully capable of playing as many positions as Lowrie is, if not more, and would be a perfect fit as a utility guy if Lowrie demonstrates that he's ready to take over the job at shortstop long-term.
(There has been quite a bit of talk about Jose Iglesias this winter and how he'll be ready to take over in 2012. That, though, only means we've all forgotten the lesson of Lars Anderson -- and while no one here is giving up on Anderson, he's a warning sign to those who assume highly touted prospects always will skip merrily through the minor leagues.)
Scutaro is the Red Sox shortstop for the short-term, a slick-fielding defender who can work counts and get on base with any shortstop in the game. A two-year deal for Scutaro, though, doesn't necessarily mean a two-year wait for Lowrie.
Matt Holliday can hit on the road
With the new rumor circulating that Jason Bay is being courted by the Seattle Mariners, it makes sense to take a look at the other high-profile left fielder on the market. Matt Holliday is younger than Bay and a better outfielder than Bay, but his inability to hit in his four months in the American League, not to mention his history with Coors Field, makes one wary of how he might do in Boston.
It doesn't take much investigating, though, to discover that Holliday might be just the type of well-rounded hitter the Red Sox need.
Holliday was a beneficiary of Coors Field for years. He put up an OPS at home of 1.000 or better in four straight years with the Rockies and never OPS'ed less than .982 in his six seasons in Colorado. What's remarkable about his numbers on the road, though, is the obvious trend:
Matt Holliday's year-by-year OPS on the road
2004: .654
2005: .729
2006: .819
2007: .860
2008: .892
2009: .830
As Holliday has matured as a hitter, his numbers on the road have climbed northward year after year. He can be considered a hitter who will put up an OPS of close to .850 on the road every year -- a mark that would have ranked him fourth on the Red Sox last season:
* Kevin Youkilis, .933
* Victor Martinez, .925
* Jason Bay, .904
* J.D. Drew, .844
* Jacoby Ellsbury, .742
* Dustin Pedroia, .736
* Mike Lowell, .713
* David Ortiz, .703
The Red Sox don't need another hitter who will tattoo the Green Monster. They already score runs in bunches at home. The Red Sox need a hitter with power to all fields, a hitter who can take advantage of the short porch in right field at Yankee Stadium just as easily as he can take advantage of the short porch in left field at Fenway Park.
Check out the home runs Holliday hit in 2009:
And in 2008:
Holliday has gotten better and better on the road every year -- and he has the power-to-all-fields swing that's indicative of strong road hitters.
He's probably never going to replicate the 1.012 OPS he put up three seasons ago with the help of Coors Field. But there's little reason to believe he can't replicate the .921 OPS Jason Bay put up last season -- and he'd probably play better defense, too.
It doesn't take much investigating, though, to discover that Holliday might be just the type of well-rounded hitter the Red Sox need.
Holliday was a beneficiary of Coors Field for years. He put up an OPS at home of 1.000 or better in four straight years with the Rockies and never OPS'ed less than .982 in his six seasons in Colorado. What's remarkable about his numbers on the road, though, is the obvious trend:
Matt Holliday's year-by-year OPS on the road
2004: .654
2005: .729
2006: .819
2007: .860
2008: .892
2009: .830
As Holliday has matured as a hitter, his numbers on the road have climbed northward year after year. He can be considered a hitter who will put up an OPS of close to .850 on the road every year -- a mark that would have ranked him fourth on the Red Sox last season:
* Kevin Youkilis, .933
* Victor Martinez, .925
* Jason Bay, .904
* J.D. Drew, .844
* Jacoby Ellsbury, .742
* Dustin Pedroia, .736
* Mike Lowell, .713
* David Ortiz, .703
The Red Sox don't need another hitter who will tattoo the Green Monster. They already score runs in bunches at home. The Red Sox need a hitter with power to all fields, a hitter who can take advantage of the short porch in right field at Yankee Stadium just as easily as he can take advantage of the short porch in left field at Fenway Park.
Check out the home runs Holliday hit in 2009:
And in 2008:
Holliday has gotten better and better on the road every year -- and he has the power-to-all-fields swing that's indicative of strong road hitters.
He's probably never going to replicate the 1.012 OPS he put up three seasons ago with the help of Coors Field. But there's little reason to believe he can't replicate the .921 OPS Jason Bay put up last season -- and he'd probably play better defense, too.
Confidence, power growing for Kalish
(This story appeared in the print edition of the Union Leader.)
Time was once when Ryan Kalish believed himself something of a slap hitter.
Home runs were few and far between for an athlete built powerfully enough to be offered a football scholarship to Virginia. Doubles weren’t exactly flying off his bat, either. His on-base percentage – .471 at Single-A Lowell in 2007 and .376 at Single-A Greenville in 2008 – seemed to be his ticket to the major leagues.
Not so much anymore. Kalish hit 18 home runs last season in barely 500 at-bats split between Single-A Salem and Double-A Portland, and his .457 slugging percentage ranked him fifth among Red Sox minor leaguers with at least 400 at-bats last season.
“In 2008, I was trying to make contact and flick balls over the infielders’ heads,” Kalish said. “This year, I had more of a mental approach where, ‘If I see this pitch, I’m going to absolutely destroy it,’ and that definitely helps me.”
When Baseball America releases its annual organization ranking in mid-December, Kalish willl almost certainly be among the top five prospects in the Red Sox system. He might even rank ahead of much-hyped first baseman Lars Anderson and fellow power-hitting outfielder Josh Reddick.
Come next spring, Kalish will have a chance to do what Reddick did a year ago. He’ll be under consideration to go to major-league camp in spring training, and he’ll be in position to make the leap to the major leagues if the Red Sox should need an outfielder.
The way Kalish hit with the Mesa Solar Sox in October and November only makes that leap more likely. Arizona Fall League statistics always should be taken with a grain of salt given the irregularity of hitters’ at-bats, but the outfielder hit .301 with a .384 on-base percentage in 73 at-bats this fall.
Reddick, for the sake of comparison, hit .189 in 95 at-bats in the Arizona Fall League a year ago. Aaron Bates, a first baseman who made a brief cameo in the major leagues in July, hit .200 in 25 at-bats in Arizona and struck out 14 times.
“Aaron Bates and Josh Reddick struggled here,” Kalish said by phone a few days before the AFL season ended. “It’s a testament to them that they came back this year – and look at what happened to them in getting to the big leagues. For me, it’s not the success. It’s the experience. They’re both great players, but this helped them get to the big leagues. I’m positive of that.”
Billy McMillon, the Mesa hitting coach who worked with Kalish at Single-A Greenville in 2008, is positive of a couple of other things: Kalish already was well on his way to the major leagues – and he was never, ever a slap hitter.
“In my humble opinion, Kalish overthought things,” McMillon said. “He thought, with the fact that he didn’t have 19 home runs last year, he thought he wasn’t driving the ball, but that doesn’t mean he wasn’t necessarily driving the ball. When he hit 19 or 20 home runs, he thinks he can drive the ball when it’s been there all along. I don’t think anyone would say he was a slap hitter last year. Things just worked out a little bit better in his favor. …
“Could he be a little stronger this year? Perhaps. But I don’t think anyone would think he was a slap hitter. It’s easy to look at home-run totals from one year to the next and say he developed power – well, not necessarily.”
On one hand, Kalish needed to figure that out for himself. On the other hand, though, he needed a little nudging to remember he wasn’t a guy who should be flicking pitches into center field and instead should be driving them up the gap.
“Everybody, especially when they’re young, has a tendency to try to do too much, to press,” McMillon said. “One of the big things I’ve been trying to get him to do is to trust his ability and to trust the work he’s put into it.”
That’s the type of straight talk Kalish wants from his coaches – and that goes for the guys playing with him, too, too.
Kalish became good friends this fall with Florida Marlins prospect Bryan Peterson, an outfielder with the Solar Sox who hit a team-best .379 with 12 extra-base hits in fewer than 100 at-bats. The two bounced ideas off each other pretty much anytime the inclination struck – in the batting cage, during outfield drills, between innings of games. Kalish even credited Peterson with an adjustment motion in the outfield that’s given him a little more oomph behind his throws.
“During the game, I’ll go up to him and ask him, ‘Hey, do you think that was the right play?’” Kalish said. “He’ll tell me straight up there. People are going to be out there trying to help me, but some people fish for compliments, and we’re straight up with each other. He comes up to me and asks if I think that was a strike, maybe, on a pitch he took. I’ll tell him, ‘Yeah, I think it was.’”
There’s a self-confidence in those words that might not have been there for Kalish a year ago – and that self-confidence has pushed him to the brink of the major leagues.
Time was once when Ryan Kalish believed himself something of a slap hitter.
Home runs were few and far between for an athlete built powerfully enough to be offered a football scholarship to Virginia. Doubles weren’t exactly flying off his bat, either. His on-base percentage – .471 at Single-A Lowell in 2007 and .376 at Single-A Greenville in 2008 – seemed to be his ticket to the major leagues.
Not so much anymore. Kalish hit 18 home runs last season in barely 500 at-bats split between Single-A Salem and Double-A Portland, and his .457 slugging percentage ranked him fifth among Red Sox minor leaguers with at least 400 at-bats last season.
“In 2008, I was trying to make contact and flick balls over the infielders’ heads,” Kalish said. “This year, I had more of a mental approach where, ‘If I see this pitch, I’m going to absolutely destroy it,’ and that definitely helps me.”
When Baseball America releases its annual organization ranking in mid-December, Kalish willl almost certainly be among the top five prospects in the Red Sox system. He might even rank ahead of much-hyped first baseman Lars Anderson and fellow power-hitting outfielder Josh Reddick.
Come next spring, Kalish will have a chance to do what Reddick did a year ago. He’ll be under consideration to go to major-league camp in spring training, and he’ll be in position to make the leap to the major leagues if the Red Sox should need an outfielder.
The way Kalish hit with the Mesa Solar Sox in October and November only makes that leap more likely. Arizona Fall League statistics always should be taken with a grain of salt given the irregularity of hitters’ at-bats, but the outfielder hit .301 with a .384 on-base percentage in 73 at-bats this fall.
Reddick, for the sake of comparison, hit .189 in 95 at-bats in the Arizona Fall League a year ago. Aaron Bates, a first baseman who made a brief cameo in the major leagues in July, hit .200 in 25 at-bats in Arizona and struck out 14 times.
“Aaron Bates and Josh Reddick struggled here,” Kalish said by phone a few days before the AFL season ended. “It’s a testament to them that they came back this year – and look at what happened to them in getting to the big leagues. For me, it’s not the success. It’s the experience. They’re both great players, but this helped them get to the big leagues. I’m positive of that.”
Billy McMillon, the Mesa hitting coach who worked with Kalish at Single-A Greenville in 2008, is positive of a couple of other things: Kalish already was well on his way to the major leagues – and he was never, ever a slap hitter.
“In my humble opinion, Kalish overthought things,” McMillon said. “He thought, with the fact that he didn’t have 19 home runs last year, he thought he wasn’t driving the ball, but that doesn’t mean he wasn’t necessarily driving the ball. When he hit 19 or 20 home runs, he thinks he can drive the ball when it’s been there all along. I don’t think anyone would say he was a slap hitter last year. Things just worked out a little bit better in his favor. …
“Could he be a little stronger this year? Perhaps. But I don’t think anyone would think he was a slap hitter. It’s easy to look at home-run totals from one year to the next and say he developed power – well, not necessarily.”
On one hand, Kalish needed to figure that out for himself. On the other hand, though, he needed a little nudging to remember he wasn’t a guy who should be flicking pitches into center field and instead should be driving them up the gap.
“Everybody, especially when they’re young, has a tendency to try to do too much, to press,” McMillon said. “One of the big things I’ve been trying to get him to do is to trust his ability and to trust the work he’s put into it.”
That’s the type of straight talk Kalish wants from his coaches – and that goes for the guys playing with him, too, too.
Kalish became good friends this fall with Florida Marlins prospect Bryan Peterson, an outfielder with the Solar Sox who hit a team-best .379 with 12 extra-base hits in fewer than 100 at-bats. The two bounced ideas off each other pretty much anytime the inclination struck – in the batting cage, during outfield drills, between innings of games. Kalish even credited Peterson with an adjustment motion in the outfield that’s given him a little more oomph behind his throws.
“During the game, I’ll go up to him and ask him, ‘Hey, do you think that was the right play?’” Kalish said. “He’ll tell me straight up there. People are going to be out there trying to help me, but some people fish for compliments, and we’re straight up with each other. He comes up to me and asks if I think that was a strike, maybe, on a pitch he took. I’ll tell him, ‘Yeah, I think it was.’”
There’s a self-confidence in those words that might not have been there for Kalish a year ago – and that self-confidence has pushed him to the brink of the major leagues.
Breaking down a Ronnie Brown-less Wildcat
You might think the Patriots have caught a break, particularly in their ongoing efforts to figure out the Wildcat, with the season-ending injury to Ronnie Brown.
You'd be wrong.
The Dolphins indeed seem to have shelved the original Wildcat formation they debuted last season against the Patriots, the formation in which Brown took a shotgun snap with Williams lined up as a wide receiver:
In the Wildcat that Miami threw at the Patriots so successfully a year ago, Brown (23) took the snap with Williams (23) coming in motion as if to run a sweep. Brown either handed off to Williams or kept the ball himself with the option to run either left or right. If the Patriots overwhelmed the Dolphins at the line of scrimmage, Brown also could throw to a wide receiver down the field.
(The Dolphins also ran a Wildcat package with only a running back and a fullback in the backfield. The basic idea of the Wildcat is to make the defense account for the quarterback even during running plays, and that turns a 10-on-11 matchup into an 11-on-11 matchup.)
Without Brown, who was placed on injured reserve two weeks ago with a foot injury, the Dolphins have had little trouble running the Wildcat with Williams out of the backfield.
They also just come up with an even more dangerous package -- one featuring rookie Pat White, a prolific option quarterback for four years at West Virginia.
"They had the one Wildcat package with Ronnie and Ricky in the game with the speed sweep with Williams coming across the field," Patriots coach Bill Belichick said on Wednesday. "That looks like that's died out and has been replaced with more of a Pat White package. ...
"They used it successfully against us. But they’ve built on that the last three weeks against Tampa, Carolina and then Buffalo. It looks to me like 95 percent of their offense is the same as it was with Ronnie and looks like they’ve maybe replaced a little bit of that Wildcat package with both of them in there with some other things, maybe the Pat White package, I don’t know."
Indeed.
The most dangerous Wildcat package requires three things:
1. Two players in the backfield, including the player who takes the shotgun snap, who can run with the ball.
2. At least one who can throw the ball.
3. Blockers who pick up their assignments.
Brown could throw the ball -- both of his two career touchdown passes have come against the Patriots -- but not the way White can throw the ball.
"He’s a quarterback," Belichick said. "Ronnie's not the passer Pat is and Pat's not the runner that Ronnie is, but they both can do elements of both. That's how they give you problems."
When the Dolphins unveiled White against the Patriots a month ago, Brown was still available -- but he wasn't even in the game.
White (6) lined up in the shotgun next to fullback Lousaka Polite (36) with Williams (34) deep behind him. White took the snap and began to run an option to his right as the play took shape in front of him:
1. The right tackle and right guard had to block the Patriots' defensive end on that side.
2. The tight end had to get to the second level of the defense to block a linebacker.
3. The center had to get to the second level to block a linebacker.
4. The wide receiver had to get downfield to block the corner.
5. Polite had to get downfield to block the safety.
Nine blockers took care of nine defensive players. The only two who were allowed to run free were (a) the safety on the opposite side of the field, and (b) the outside linebacker on the near side of the field. If the linebacker went after White, though, he pitched it to Williams. If the linebacker went after Williams, White took it himself:
The first time the Dolphins ran the play, Tully Banta-Cain sprinted straight for Williams -- and White ran for a 33-yard gain. The second time the Dolphins ran the play, Adalius Thomas waited patiently for White -- so the pitch went to Williams, who ran for 15 yards and a touchdown.
White even can throw the ball, something the Dolphins haven't shown much yet but likely will show more as the quarterback gets more experience within the offense. White completed six of his 16 pass attempts in the preseason, but he's missed on all three of his pass attempts so far this season.
Against the Patriots, he took a shotgun snap with Ronnie Brown alongside him and three wide receivers on the field, as basic as a formation gets. His pass for Greg Camarillo sailed well out of bounds -- but it was the pressure of Banta-Cain that ruined the play more than anything else. In his senior season at West Virginia, after all, White completed 65.7 percent of his passes for 1,844 yards and 21 touchdowns.
Having White throw the ball is a wrinkle the Dolphins haven't yet mastered, but it's inevitable -- and you might see it this week in a must-win game against the Patriots.
"That's one of the hard things about playing Miami: They keep it moving on you," Belichick said. "You work on one thing, and they're working on something else. Sometimes they come back to it and sometimes they don’t, so you’ve got a lot of different bases to cover. They did a good job of keeping us off balance. They just keep pecking away and sooner or later they get you on something where you don't have quite the right placement or technique or distribution on, and you can be in trouble."
Even without Ronnie Brown in the backfield.
You'd be wrong.
The Dolphins indeed seem to have shelved the original Wildcat formation they debuted last season against the Patriots, the formation in which Brown took a shotgun snap with Williams lined up as a wide receiver:
In the Wildcat that Miami threw at the Patriots so successfully a year ago, Brown (23) took the snap with Williams (23) coming in motion as if to run a sweep. Brown either handed off to Williams or kept the ball himself with the option to run either left or right. If the Patriots overwhelmed the Dolphins at the line of scrimmage, Brown also could throw to a wide receiver down the field.
(The Dolphins also ran a Wildcat package with only a running back and a fullback in the backfield. The basic idea of the Wildcat is to make the defense account for the quarterback even during running plays, and that turns a 10-on-11 matchup into an 11-on-11 matchup.)
Without Brown, who was placed on injured reserve two weeks ago with a foot injury, the Dolphins have had little trouble running the Wildcat with Williams out of the backfield.
They also just come up with an even more dangerous package -- one featuring rookie Pat White, a prolific option quarterback for four years at West Virginia.
"They had the one Wildcat package with Ronnie and Ricky in the game with the speed sweep with Williams coming across the field," Patriots coach Bill Belichick said on Wednesday. "That looks like that's died out and has been replaced with more of a Pat White package. ...
"They used it successfully against us. But they’ve built on that the last three weeks against Tampa, Carolina and then Buffalo. It looks to me like 95 percent of their offense is the same as it was with Ronnie and looks like they’ve maybe replaced a little bit of that Wildcat package with both of them in there with some other things, maybe the Pat White package, I don’t know."
Indeed.
The most dangerous Wildcat package requires three things:
1. Two players in the backfield, including the player who takes the shotgun snap, who can run with the ball.
2. At least one who can throw the ball.
3. Blockers who pick up their assignments.
Brown could throw the ball -- both of his two career touchdown passes have come against the Patriots -- but not the way White can throw the ball.
"He’s a quarterback," Belichick said. "Ronnie's not the passer Pat is and Pat's not the runner that Ronnie is, but they both can do elements of both. That's how they give you problems."
When the Dolphins unveiled White against the Patriots a month ago, Brown was still available -- but he wasn't even in the game.
White (6) lined up in the shotgun next to fullback Lousaka Polite (36) with Williams (34) deep behind him. White took the snap and began to run an option to his right as the play took shape in front of him:
1. The right tackle and right guard had to block the Patriots' defensive end on that side.
2. The tight end had to get to the second level of the defense to block a linebacker.
3. The center had to get to the second level to block a linebacker.
4. The wide receiver had to get downfield to block the corner.
5. Polite had to get downfield to block the safety.
Nine blockers took care of nine defensive players. The only two who were allowed to run free were (a) the safety on the opposite side of the field, and (b) the outside linebacker on the near side of the field. If the linebacker went after White, though, he pitched it to Williams. If the linebacker went after Williams, White took it himself:
The first time the Dolphins ran the play, Tully Banta-Cain sprinted straight for Williams -- and White ran for a 33-yard gain. The second time the Dolphins ran the play, Adalius Thomas waited patiently for White -- so the pitch went to Williams, who ran for 15 yards and a touchdown.
White even can throw the ball, something the Dolphins haven't shown much yet but likely will show more as the quarterback gets more experience within the offense. White completed six of his 16 pass attempts in the preseason, but he's missed on all three of his pass attempts so far this season.
Against the Patriots, he took a shotgun snap with Ronnie Brown alongside him and three wide receivers on the field, as basic as a formation gets. His pass for Greg Camarillo sailed well out of bounds -- but it was the pressure of Banta-Cain that ruined the play more than anything else. In his senior season at West Virginia, after all, White completed 65.7 percent of his passes for 1,844 yards and 21 touchdowns.
Having White throw the ball is a wrinkle the Dolphins haven't yet mastered, but it's inevitable -- and you might see it this week in a must-win game against the Patriots.
"That's one of the hard things about playing Miami: They keep it moving on you," Belichick said. "You work on one thing, and they're working on something else. Sometimes they come back to it and sometimes they don’t, so you’ve got a lot of different bases to cover. They did a good job of keeping us off balance. They just keep pecking away and sooner or later they get you on something where you don't have quite the right placement or technique or distribution on, and you can be in trouble."
Even without Ronnie Brown in the backfield.
Wednesday, December 2, 2009
Kiko Calero might be a late-inning option
A post in this space already examined some of the options for the Red Sox as they replace Takashi Saito and Billy Wagner in the bullpen next season. The core of the bullpen -- Jonathan Papelbon, Hideki Okajima, Daniel Bard, Ramon Ramirez and Manny Delcarmen -- will return intact barring a trade. But the Red Sox aren't likely to go to spring training without the quality bullpen depth they had a year ago, the type of quality depth that lifted them to a playoff berth.
One option out there on the market -- an option that wouldn't cost a draft pick in compensation, even -- is Florida righty Kiko Calero.
The 34-year-old righty -- whose middle name is Nomar, incidentally -- posted a 1.95 ERA and a strikeout-to-walk ratio of 2.30 with the Marlins last season. His WHIP of 1.100 ranked him 20th among relievers in the major leagues, and his ERA+ of 217 ranked him eighth in the major leagues -- ahead of Ryan Franklin, Joe Nathan, Joakim Soria and Francisco Cordero.
He doesn't have overpowering raw stuff. His fastball tops out at 90 miles an hour, and his out pitch is an 80-mile-an-hour sweeping slider. (He threw his slider 54.4 percent of the time last season.)
But he does not give up home runs: Opponents have gone deep eight times (and OPS'ed .646) in their last 685 plate appearances against him. That's often something that one can attribute to luck, something that can even out for a pitcher over time, but Calero hasn't had a home-run rate better than 2.7 percent, the major-league avearge, since Edgar Renteria grounded to Keith Foulke.
(Calero, you'll remember, pitched for the Cardinals in the 2004 World Series and gave up an RBI single to Manny Ramirez in the seventh inning of the wild Game 1.)
He doesn't have to be the team's eighth-inning guy. Okajima and Bard likely will have first claim to that role. But opponents have hit .203 against him in his career with two outs and runnings in scoring position, and he's held opponents to a batting average under .200 when pitching on back-to-back days or on one day of rest.
Other than a walk total that's a tick above the major-league average -- something that's acceptable with his strikeout rate -- Calero might be a pretty nice fit for the Red Sox bullpen next season.
One option out there on the market -- an option that wouldn't cost a draft pick in compensation, even -- is Florida righty Kiko Calero.
The 34-year-old righty -- whose middle name is Nomar, incidentally -- posted a 1.95 ERA and a strikeout-to-walk ratio of 2.30 with the Marlins last season. His WHIP of 1.100 ranked him 20th among relievers in the major leagues, and his ERA+ of 217 ranked him eighth in the major leagues -- ahead of Ryan Franklin, Joe Nathan, Joakim Soria and Francisco Cordero.
He doesn't have overpowering raw stuff. His fastball tops out at 90 miles an hour, and his out pitch is an 80-mile-an-hour sweeping slider. (He threw his slider 54.4 percent of the time last season.)
But he does not give up home runs: Opponents have gone deep eight times (and OPS'ed .646) in their last 685 plate appearances against him. That's often something that one can attribute to luck, something that can even out for a pitcher over time, but Calero hasn't had a home-run rate better than 2.7 percent, the major-league avearge, since Edgar Renteria grounded to Keith Foulke.
(Calero, you'll remember, pitched for the Cardinals in the 2004 World Series and gave up an RBI single to Manny Ramirez in the seventh inning of the wild Game 1.)
He doesn't have to be the team's eighth-inning guy. Okajima and Bard likely will have first claim to that role. But opponents have hit .203 against him in his career with two outs and runnings in scoring position, and he's held opponents to a batting average under .200 when pitching on back-to-back days or on one day of rest.
Other than a walk total that's a tick above the major-league average -- something that's acceptable with his strikeout rate -- Calero might be a pretty nice fit for the Red Sox bullpen next season.
Felipe Lopez a Scutaro-type fit for Red Sox
With the news today that Dustin Pedroia is open to a move to shortstop -- and keep in mind Pedroia only moved to second base to accomodate Hanley Ramirez -- the options for the Red Sox seem to have been thrown wide open. A team that seemed to be at the mercy of Marco Scutaro, natural fit that he might be, all of a sudden can take a look at the pool of available second basemen as it tries to fill out its infield.
Consider last year's the Wins Above Replacement numbers for the available middle infielders on the market -- and, for reference, Pedroia was worth 6.2 wins above his replacement last season:
Second basemen
Ronnie Belliard, 1.3
Eric Bruntlett, minus-1.0
Jamey Carroll, 1.5
Craig Counsell, 2.8
Ray Durham, 2.6
Damion Easley, 1.5
Orlando Hudson, 2.9
Adam Kennedy, 1.7
Felipe Lopez, 4.6
Mark Loretta, minus-0.2
Placido Polanco, 3.1
Shortstops
Orlando Cabrera, 0.6
Bobby Crosby, minus-0.7
Adam Everett, 0.9
Khalil Greene, minus-0.8
Marco Scutaro, 4.5
Miguel Tejada, 2.6
WAR, of course, is far from a perfect stat. But it is a stat that incorporates both offense and defense -- that's how Adam Everett is in the black despite an on-base percentage of .288 last season -- and it's a good starting point for measuring quality.
Scutaro, of course, is near the top of the list. But there's another player who actually had a higher Wins Above Replacement number than Scutaro -- and a player who can play either shortstop or second base at an acceptable level in the major leagues: Felipe Lopez. The 29-year-old infielder has bounced around throughout his career, but he posted the highest on-base percentage (.383) and slugging percentage (.427) of his career last season. His ability to work the count, though, has never wavered -- he's seen 4.0 pitches per plate appearance (or better) four times in his nine seasons.
As long as we've looking at infielders who had career years last year, let's compare Lopez head-to-head with some of the bigger names on the list:
On-base percentage in 2009
Orlando Hudson: .357
Felipe Lopez: .383
Placido Polanco: .331
Marco Scutaro: .379
On-base percentage, career
Hudson: .348
Lopez: .338
Polanco: .348
Scutaro: .337
Swinging at pitches out of the strike zone in 2009
Hudson: 20.6 percent
Lopez: 21.5 percent
Polanco: 23.7 percent
Scutaro: 12.3 percent
Swinging at pitches out of the strike zone, career
Hudson: 17.7 percent
Lopez: 19 percent
Polanco: 21 percent
Scutaro: 14.5 percent
Pitches per plate appearance, 2009
Hudson: 3.86
Lopez: 3.92
Polanco: 3.48
Scutaro: 4.06
Pitches per plate appearance, career
Hudson: 3.80
Lopez: 3.97
Polanco: 3.37
Scutaro: 3.79
Ultimate Zone Rating/150, 2009
Hudson (at 2B): minus-3.7
Lopez (at 2B): 7.6
Polanco (at 2B): 11.0
Scutaro (at SS): 1.0
Ultimate Zone Rating/150, career
Hudson (at 2B): 2.6
Lopez (at 2B): 2.6
Polanco (at 2B): 10.0
Scutaro (at SS): minus-2.9
Polanco appears to be the best option defensively but by far the worst option for what the Red Sox are trying to do offensively -- in other words, the same type of player as Alex Gonzalez. Hudson, on the other hand, has seen his defensive abilities decline rapidly and wouldn't necessarily be a fit, either. If the Red Sox were willing to settle for subpar defense at second base, they might as well make a deal for Florida's Dan Uggla.
(Uggla had a WAR of 2.9 last season even with his defensive deficiencies.)
Looking at the numbers, though, there's not really a measurable difference between Lopez and Scutaro -- and given that Lopez has the ability to play shortstop as well as second base, he's worth as much discussion around these parts as the man whose bandwagon this blog has driven.
Consider last year's the Wins Above Replacement numbers for the available middle infielders on the market -- and, for reference, Pedroia was worth 6.2 wins above his replacement last season:
Second basemen
Ronnie Belliard, 1.3
Eric Bruntlett, minus-1.0
Jamey Carroll, 1.5
Craig Counsell, 2.8
Ray Durham, 2.6
Damion Easley, 1.5
Orlando Hudson, 2.9
Adam Kennedy, 1.7
Felipe Lopez, 4.6
Mark Loretta, minus-0.2
Placido Polanco, 3.1
Shortstops
Orlando Cabrera, 0.6
Bobby Crosby, minus-0.7
Adam Everett, 0.9
Khalil Greene, minus-0.8
Marco Scutaro, 4.5
Miguel Tejada, 2.6
WAR, of course, is far from a perfect stat. But it is a stat that incorporates both offense and defense -- that's how Adam Everett is in the black despite an on-base percentage of .288 last season -- and it's a good starting point for measuring quality.
Scutaro, of course, is near the top of the list. But there's another player who actually had a higher Wins Above Replacement number than Scutaro -- and a player who can play either shortstop or second base at an acceptable level in the major leagues: Felipe Lopez. The 29-year-old infielder has bounced around throughout his career, but he posted the highest on-base percentage (.383) and slugging percentage (.427) of his career last season. His ability to work the count, though, has never wavered -- he's seen 4.0 pitches per plate appearance (or better) four times in his nine seasons.
As long as we've looking at infielders who had career years last year, let's compare Lopez head-to-head with some of the bigger names on the list:
On-base percentage in 2009
Orlando Hudson: .357
Felipe Lopez: .383
Placido Polanco: .331
Marco Scutaro: .379
On-base percentage, career
Hudson: .348
Lopez: .338
Polanco: .348
Scutaro: .337
Swinging at pitches out of the strike zone in 2009
Hudson: 20.6 percent
Lopez: 21.5 percent
Polanco: 23.7 percent
Scutaro: 12.3 percent
Swinging at pitches out of the strike zone, career
Hudson: 17.7 percent
Lopez: 19 percent
Polanco: 21 percent
Scutaro: 14.5 percent
Pitches per plate appearance, 2009
Hudson: 3.86
Lopez: 3.92
Polanco: 3.48
Scutaro: 4.06
Pitches per plate appearance, career
Hudson: 3.80
Lopez: 3.97
Polanco: 3.37
Scutaro: 3.79
Ultimate Zone Rating/150, 2009
Hudson (at 2B): minus-3.7
Lopez (at 2B): 7.6
Polanco (at 2B): 11.0
Scutaro (at SS): 1.0
Ultimate Zone Rating/150, career
Hudson (at 2B): 2.6
Lopez (at 2B): 2.6
Polanco (at 2B): 10.0
Scutaro (at SS): minus-2.9
Polanco appears to be the best option defensively but by far the worst option for what the Red Sox are trying to do offensively -- in other words, the same type of player as Alex Gonzalez. Hudson, on the other hand, has seen his defensive abilities decline rapidly and wouldn't necessarily be a fit, either. If the Red Sox were willing to settle for subpar defense at second base, they might as well make a deal for Florida's Dan Uggla.
(Uggla had a WAR of 2.9 last season even with his defensive deficiencies.)
Looking at the numbers, though, there's not really a measurable difference between Lopez and Scutaro -- and given that Lopez has the ability to play shortstop as well as second base, he's worth as much discussion around these parts as the man whose bandwagon this blog has driven.
Tuesday, December 1, 2009
Billy Wagner's big decision
(Postscript: Wagner agreed to a deal with the Atlanta Braves barely hours after this was posted. Must have been an exciting dinner.)
It sure would be fascinating to sit at the Wagner dinner table this week as Billy and his family decide whether or not to accept an offer of salary arbitration from the Red Sox and thus agree to return to Boston as a middle reliever next season. (The deadline is Monday.)
On the one hand, it's unlikely Wagner -- especially with the Type A tag attached to him -- is going to earn more than he'll be awarded by a panel of arbitrators in January. On the other hand, Wagner ranks sixth all-time in saves with 385 and has made clear that getting to 400 is an important milestone both for him and for his Hall of Fame aspirations.
(The Hall of Fame is a legitimate consideration as Wagner is thinking about his individual statistics. His fantasy baseball team is not.)
The hard-throwing lefty earned $10.5 million last season. The option the Red Sox agreed not to exercise was worth $8 million. It's hard to believe a salary arbitration award would be less than $10 million.
It's equally hard to believe, though, that the 38-year-old Wagner is going to get $10 million a year on the open market. Among the teams that might be interested:
* Atlanta: The Braves offered arbitration on Tuesday to relievers Mike Gonzalez and Rafael Soriano but might want to upgrade to someone a little more overpowering. The price tag for Wagner, though, might take the Braves out of the bidding.
* Baltimore: This might have more to do with how the Orioles view their young pitchers than anything else. If the Orioles believe they're ready to make a Tampa Bay-type run in the East, a closer might be the finishing touch -- but Wagner would have be convinced of that, too.
* Detroit: Fernando Rodney is on the open market and has been as erratic as it gets, but it's not likely the cost-cutting Tigers are going to pay for someone like Wagner.
* Texas: No one seized the ninth-inning job for the Rangers last season, but like the Orioles, a closer might be the last piece of the puzzle if they're to make the leap next season.
It sure would be fascinating to sit at the Wagner dinner table this week as Billy and his family decide whether or not to accept an offer of salary arbitration from the Red Sox and thus agree to return to Boston as a middle reliever next season. (The deadline is Monday.)
On the one hand, it's unlikely Wagner -- especially with the Type A tag attached to him -- is going to earn more than he'll be awarded by a panel of arbitrators in January. On the other hand, Wagner ranks sixth all-time in saves with 385 and has made clear that getting to 400 is an important milestone both for him and for his Hall of Fame aspirations.
(The Hall of Fame is a legitimate consideration as Wagner is thinking about his individual statistics. His fantasy baseball team is not.)
The hard-throwing lefty earned $10.5 million last season. The option the Red Sox agreed not to exercise was worth $8 million. It's hard to believe a salary arbitration award would be less than $10 million.
It's equally hard to believe, though, that the 38-year-old Wagner is going to get $10 million a year on the open market. Among the teams that might be interested:
* Atlanta: The Braves offered arbitration on Tuesday to relievers Mike Gonzalez and Rafael Soriano but might want to upgrade to someone a little more overpowering. The price tag for Wagner, though, might take the Braves out of the bidding.
* Baltimore: This might have more to do with how the Orioles view their young pitchers than anything else. If the Orioles believe they're ready to make a Tampa Bay-type run in the East, a closer might be the finishing touch -- but Wagner would have be convinced of that, too.
* Detroit: Fernando Rodney is on the open market and has been as erratic as it gets, but it's not likely the cost-cutting Tigers are going to pay for someone like Wagner.
* Texas: No one seized the ninth-inning job for the Rangers last season, but like the Orioles, a closer might be the last piece of the puzzle if they're to make the leap next season.
Saints beat Patriots on line of scrimmage
The theory here is that the respective secondaries of the Patriots and Saints actually had very little to do with the outcome of Monday's game. The theory here is that the game came down to two factors:
* The Saints' ability to get pressure on Tom Brady with just three rushers, freeing up others to double-team Randy Moss and Wes Welker;
* The Patriots' inability to get pressure on Drew Brees even with five rushers, leaving the secondary shorthanded while still allowing Brees to step confidently into every throw.
Let's compare a pretty similar play-action pass play run by both the Saints and the Patriots in the first half -- and their dissimilar results:
The first-and-10 call was a play-action pass out of the I-formation with two receivers running down the middle of the field. Tight end Jeremy Shockey (88) ran the shallow route, and wide receiver Robert Meachem (17) ran the deep route.
The Patriots read run all the way -- safety Brandon Meriweather (31) crept toward the line of scrimmage even before the ball was snapped -- but that wasn't the only issue. Linebackers Rob Ninkovich (50) and Adalius Thomas (96) both blitzed from the outside and were picked up by the left and right tackles, respectively, with help from the Saints' two backs. Each of the Patriots' three defensive linemen were handled one-on-one by the New Orleans guards and center -- as detailed here, the strongest part of the Saints' offensive line -- and got nowhere near Brees.
With Shockey and Meachem converging in the same neighborhood, safety Brandon McGowan (30) couldn't just read the eyes of Brees to figure out where the pass would go. McGowan guessed Shockey -- and that left Jonathan Wilhite (24) in one-on-one coverage with Meachem. Wilhite never had a chance.
Had the Patriots gotten some pressure on Brees with their five pass-rushers, though, things might have turned out very differently. The coverage of Wilhite actually was pretty good, and a little pressure on Brees might have meant a pass that wasn't quite so precise.
The Patriots ran a similar play in the first half, a play-action pass with two targets down the field, but didn't get even close to the same results. Here's the diagram:
The Patriots lined up with Laurence Maroney and ran a play-action fake on second-and-8, a similar fake to the one Brees ran with his running back. Like the Saints, the Patriots sent just two receivers out wide -- Welker (83) and Moss (81) -- and kept two other skill-position players in the backfield to block.
The Saints, however, sent only four pass-rushers at Brady and dropped their other seven defenders into coverage. Defensive coordinator Gregg Williams is known as a blitz-happy coach, but he there actually were plenty of snaps on Monday that Williams sent only three pass-rushers at Brady and dropped eight into coverage.
Welker, the wide receiver who torched the Jets a week ago, lined up against Baltimore castoff Chris McAlister (29) -- but while McAlister ran with him underneath, safety Roman Harper (41) jumped into the play to cut off any pass underneath. Double coverage.
On the other side of the field, the recently signed Mike McKenzie (34) lined up deep against Randy Moss and stayed deep. Middle linebacker Jonathan Vilma (51) dropped back to cover the underneath route to Moss, and free safety Darren Sharper (42) stayed deep in case Moss suddenly took off for the end zone. Triple coverage.
Given time, Brady almost certainly would have found one of his two receivers -- or one of his tight ends (in blue on the line of scrimmage) eventually would have drifted into the flat to catch a dump-off pass. That's why so many teams blitz Brady: Given time, as talented as his receivers are, someone always is going to get open for him.
But Brady didn't have time.
Tight end Chris Baker (86) actually went in motion before the snap, moving from the right shoulder of Nick Kaczur (77) to the left shoulder of Ben Watson (84). Immediately after the ball was snapped, center Dan Koppen pulled to get to the same place, the outside shoulder of Watson, and was in position for a blitz that never came. Outside linebacker Scott Fujita (55) showed blitz, but he hung back to guard against the dump-off pass Brady loves so much.
Because Baker motioned, though, he left Kaczur one-on-one against Bobby McCray -- and McCray steamrolled him. (The Saints attacked the edges of the Patriots' line, often ignoring guards Logan Mankins and Stephen Neal -- a perfect example of exploiting a weakness.) At the same time, while Mankins (70) handled defensive tackle Remi Ayodele (92), Watson couldn't quite handle defensive end Will Smith (91). Neither Baker nor Koppen was in a position to help because they were at the end of the line waiting for a blitz that never came.
The end result: The Saints sent four pass-rushers against seven blockers -- and two of those four pass-rushers still got free. Smith busted through the hole between Watson and Mankins, and McCray ran around Kaczur like he was a slalom pole. Brady never had time to look for either Welker or for Moss -- let alone for Maroney (39), who was leaking out of the backfield to be a last-ditch outlet.
The Patriots ran almost the same play the Saints had run when they scored their third touchdown. Because the Saints won the battle at the line of scrimmage, though, they turned a potential touchdown into a sack for a loss of four yards -- and the Patriots eventually would have to settle for a field goal.
* The Saints' ability to get pressure on Tom Brady with just three rushers, freeing up others to double-team Randy Moss and Wes Welker;
* The Patriots' inability to get pressure on Drew Brees even with five rushers, leaving the secondary shorthanded while still allowing Brees to step confidently into every throw.
Let's compare a pretty similar play-action pass play run by both the Saints and the Patriots in the first half -- and their dissimilar results:
The first-and-10 call was a play-action pass out of the I-formation with two receivers running down the middle of the field. Tight end Jeremy Shockey (88) ran the shallow route, and wide receiver Robert Meachem (17) ran the deep route.
The Patriots read run all the way -- safety Brandon Meriweather (31) crept toward the line of scrimmage even before the ball was snapped -- but that wasn't the only issue. Linebackers Rob Ninkovich (50) and Adalius Thomas (96) both blitzed from the outside and were picked up by the left and right tackles, respectively, with help from the Saints' two backs. Each of the Patriots' three defensive linemen were handled one-on-one by the New Orleans guards and center -- as detailed here, the strongest part of the Saints' offensive line -- and got nowhere near Brees.
With Shockey and Meachem converging in the same neighborhood, safety Brandon McGowan (30) couldn't just read the eyes of Brees to figure out where the pass would go. McGowan guessed Shockey -- and that left Jonathan Wilhite (24) in one-on-one coverage with Meachem. Wilhite never had a chance.
Had the Patriots gotten some pressure on Brees with their five pass-rushers, though, things might have turned out very differently. The coverage of Wilhite actually was pretty good, and a little pressure on Brees might have meant a pass that wasn't quite so precise.
The Patriots ran a similar play in the first half, a play-action pass with two targets down the field, but didn't get even close to the same results. Here's the diagram:
The Patriots lined up with Laurence Maroney and ran a play-action fake on second-and-8, a similar fake to the one Brees ran with his running back. Like the Saints, the Patriots sent just two receivers out wide -- Welker (83) and Moss (81) -- and kept two other skill-position players in the backfield to block.
The Saints, however, sent only four pass-rushers at Brady and dropped their other seven defenders into coverage. Defensive coordinator Gregg Williams is known as a blitz-happy coach, but he there actually were plenty of snaps on Monday that Williams sent only three pass-rushers at Brady and dropped eight into coverage.
Welker, the wide receiver who torched the Jets a week ago, lined up against Baltimore castoff Chris McAlister (29) -- but while McAlister ran with him underneath, safety Roman Harper (41) jumped into the play to cut off any pass underneath. Double coverage.
On the other side of the field, the recently signed Mike McKenzie (34) lined up deep against Randy Moss and stayed deep. Middle linebacker Jonathan Vilma (51) dropped back to cover the underneath route to Moss, and free safety Darren Sharper (42) stayed deep in case Moss suddenly took off for the end zone. Triple coverage.
Given time, Brady almost certainly would have found one of his two receivers -- or one of his tight ends (in blue on the line of scrimmage) eventually would have drifted into the flat to catch a dump-off pass. That's why so many teams blitz Brady: Given time, as talented as his receivers are, someone always is going to get open for him.
But Brady didn't have time.
Tight end Chris Baker (86) actually went in motion before the snap, moving from the right shoulder of Nick Kaczur (77) to the left shoulder of Ben Watson (84). Immediately after the ball was snapped, center Dan Koppen pulled to get to the same place, the outside shoulder of Watson, and was in position for a blitz that never came. Outside linebacker Scott Fujita (55) showed blitz, but he hung back to guard against the dump-off pass Brady loves so much.
Because Baker motioned, though, he left Kaczur one-on-one against Bobby McCray -- and McCray steamrolled him. (The Saints attacked the edges of the Patriots' line, often ignoring guards Logan Mankins and Stephen Neal -- a perfect example of exploiting a weakness.) At the same time, while Mankins (70) handled defensive tackle Remi Ayodele (92), Watson couldn't quite handle defensive end Will Smith (91). Neither Baker nor Koppen was in a position to help because they were at the end of the line waiting for a blitz that never came.
The end result: The Saints sent four pass-rushers against seven blockers -- and two of those four pass-rushers still got free. Smith busted through the hole between Watson and Mankins, and McCray ran around Kaczur like he was a slalom pole. Brady never had time to look for either Welker or for Moss -- let alone for Maroney (39), who was leaking out of the backfield to be a last-ditch outlet.
The Patriots ran almost the same play the Saints had run when they scored their third touchdown. Because the Saints won the battle at the line of scrimmage, though, they turned a potential touchdown into a sack for a loss of four yards -- and the Patriots eventually would have to settle for a field goal.
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